A PROSPECT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE Preſent Conduct of *Great Britain* TOWARDS *AMERICA.*

Ogni atto di autorità di uomo a uomo che non derivi dall'aſſoluta neceſſità è tirannico.

BECARIA, § 2. p. 15.

LONDON:

Printed for J. ALMON, oppoſite Burlington-Houſe, in Piccadilly. 1776.

[PRICE ONE SHILLING AND SIX-PENCE.]

TO THE READER.

I HAVE ſeen very few of the polemical tracts on the preſent conteſt between Great Britain and America; and therefore I may very poſſibly have made uſe of arguments employed by others who have written before me on the ſame ſubject. My intention has been far from endeavouring to derive merit to myſelf from the works of others; nor do I arrogate the leaſt from my own. I look upon the preſent conteſt to be highly pernicious to Great Britain; and I think moreover, that it is not founded in juſtice; theſe are my motives for delivering my ſentiments to the Public; and this I do, without conſidering myſelf under the neceſſity of conſulting whatever may have been ſaid by others on this occaſion. I conſidered it as a duty incumbent on every one as a good citizen, and as a lover of his country, if he had any opinions which he thought might promote the public good, to deliver them at ſo perilous a ſeaſon as the preſent. In ſo doing

doing I acquit myſelf of being inſtrumental in promoting meaſures whoſe conſequences appear to me ſo fatal and deſtructive: and though as an individual I cannot reſtrain the violence of this torrent which is likely to overwhelm us, I have the internal ſatisfaction of having contributed my ſhare to oppoſe it.

It is about two months ſince I finiſhed this treatiſe, and intended it for immediate publication; but was reſtrained by diffidence. As danger increaſes, men grow bolder; and I could no longer reſiſt the ardour which puſhed me forward on the patience of the Public.

There is one circumſtance which it may not be improper to mention. I advance under the banner of no party or ſect, political or religious; I have as little connection with Americans or America as any man in Great Britain; and whatever I have ſaid has ſincerely flowed from my ideas of juſtice, and from the love and affection which I bear to this my native Country, and to its conſtitution.

A

PROSPECT

OF THE

CONSEQUENCES, &c.

THE diſtreſs to which this Nation is likely to be reduced by the preſent American conteſt is truly alarming to every man who profeſſes the leaſt regard for his country. But there are thoſe among us, as in moſt other States, who are not only indifferent about ſuch an event, however fatal, but are contented to promote it ſo long as they receive a preſent temporary advantage from the meaſure. Vigorouſly to oppoſe, and, if poſſible, to defeat the deſigns of ſuch men, is a duty incumbent on every good citizen; to neglect them, and their endeavours, is at this time likely to prove very fatal in its con-

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ſequences; and a careleſs ſupineneſs on our part may have the effect of promoting their views, and ſeems to imply a tacit conſent to, if it does not abſolutely make us accomplices in their actions.

In all States the preſiding and governing party is ſmall; but yet to promote their ambition, or other ſiniſter views, they have generally poſſeſſed artifice enough to lead the multitude into great and dangerous extravagances; and that multitude as generally pays dearly for its weakneſs and folly in the concluſion. With us, this could never be the caſe if we would ſuffer ourſelves to be well-informed, would we properly exert our legal rights and powers, and be honeſt and true to our own cauſe. A ſecret junto, an oſtenſible miniſtry, let them unite as they pleaſe, would never be able to drive us over hill and dale, rough and ſmooth, till they had plunged us into the deſtined pit, if we would but keep our eyes open, and diſdain to be hood-winked to ſerve the purpoſes of ruinous ambition. *Upon my word,* * ſays Lord Cheſterfield, who may be allowed to have been an adequate judge of ſuch men as we are ſpeaking of, *our ſpecies will pay dear for the quarrels and ambition of a few, and theſe by no means the moſt valuable part of it. If the many were*

* Letter 284.

wiſer

wiſer than they are, the few muſt be quieter, and would perhaps be juſter and better than they are. This is preciſely the caſe with the Nation at this time; inſomuch that one may imagine it a picture delineated by a pencil prophetic of the State of the Kingdom at the preſent hour. How much therefore is it the duty of the many to be wiſer, not merely to ward off diſtreſs from themſelves, an object this important enough! but to protect ſo large a body of the human ſpecies, their fellow ſubjects, both here and in America, ſet apart by the few for devoted victims to be ſacrificed on this altar of their ambition? To promote theſe ends, the public weal demands the aſſiſtance of every individual; the obligation increaſes in proportion as the times are preſſing; and no citizen can be exempted from contributing his ſhare by any plea of want of conſequence on the one hand, or pretences of inability on the other. Every man has abilities greater or leſs, of one kind or of another; every one therefore ſhould try his own ſtrength, for the complexion of theſe times requires a vigorous exertion of all.

The public are acquainted with three plans or modes of proceeding with reſpect to the Americans. The firſt, is to ſubdue them by force of arms. The ſecond, to accomodate with them the diſputed points, and to confirm to them their parliaments, with

the King, to be ſupreme legiſlatures in America. The third, is entirely to caſt them off, to reject them. Of theſe three plans, the miniſtry have adopted that which, in my opinion, will prove highly diſtreſsful and injurious to this Kingdom.

One grand, and perhaps the principal point in diſpute in our preſent conteſt with the Americans, is the article of taxation. Now I preſume no man doubts that the Americans have a right to liberty in common with Engliſhmen. But how far that right is annihilated if they are not to have the diſpoſal of their property like Engliſhmen, and if the ſupreme legiſlature of Great Britain is to enact laws for them, are ſubjects which merit a particular enquiry, becauſe they ſtand as the foundation whereon this deſtructive war is the ruinous ſuperſtructure.

The Americans aſſert, that the parliament of Great Britain hath no right to tax them: the reaſon alledged is, becauſe they are not repreſented in that parliament; if not repreſented, then they do not tax themſelves; if they do not tax themſelves, then they have not the diſpoſal of their own property; if they have not the diſpoſal of their own property, they are no longer free-men, but ſlaves. Miniſtry, and their adherents, deny this reaſoning to be good, and in anſwer to

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it alledge, that there are * nineteen perſons in twenty in Great Britain who have no vote for repreſentatives in parliament, conſequently are not repreſented, and yet are taxed by parliament; ſo that the Americans fall only under the like predicament with theſe perſons, and ought therefore to be contented with their lot.

This hath been generally eſteemed the weightieſt argument of miniſtry, delivered by their abettors, for eſtabliſhing the power of taxation in the Britiſh parliament, over America. For as to other arguments, I muſt confeſs to have neither ſeen, nor heard of any that deſerve a ſerious refutation. And this which is now before us, will I think on a candid examination, prove to be no better than a child of mere artifice and ſophiſtry. Let there be, if you will, nineteen in twenty perſons who have no ſhare in

* In converſation too we are peſtered with inſtances of perſons, who from reaſon and the nature of the thing, it is pretended, ſhould have a vote for repreſentatives in parliament, but yet have no legal right to it; and from which it is argued that the Americans, as well as theſe, ought to be taxed without repreſentation. Cannot, or will not ſuch men ſee, that on their own ſtate of the matter, they are arguing from a grievance, to the extenſion of that grievance? Would they reaſon juſtly, the concluſion ſhould be the reverſe of what they make it; and as this is a grievance, ſo far from being extended, it ought to be removed.

electing repreſentatives in parliament; yet the property of thoſe who are not repreſented lies in common, and is intermixed with that of thoſe perſons who are repreſented; and the ſame act of legiſlature taxes alike and indiſcriminately the property of him who is repreſented, as it doth the property of him who is not repreſented. For example, the tax on the land of a copyholder, which land doth not intitle him to a vote for repreſentatives in parliament, is none other than the tax on the land of his neighbour who is a freeholder, and repreſented. Legiſlature makes no diſtinction between the two perſons, nor their lands, although one be repreſented, and the other be not; one act includes both, the tax is laid alike on the property of the one and of the other, in ſhort both ſhare the ſame fate. But were legiſlature, on the contrary, to make a partial diſtinction between the perſons and the property of thoſe who are repreſented, and of thoſe who are not, to the injury of the latter, the impropriety and injuſtice of taxation without repreſentation would then be evident and manifeſt; and perſuaded I am, that ſuch taxation without repreſentation would not long be ſubmitted to. Now with reſpect to the Americans, they are ſeparated from Great Britain by ſo great a diſtance, and the ſtate of the country and its inhabitants ſo different from ours, that they cannot be included in

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the ſame acts of legiſlature with us; diſtinct acts muſt be made for America alone; and no part of them being repreſented in that legiſlature which taxes them, and neither their perſons nor their property being intermixed with theirs who are repreſented, the inhabitants of America would certainly be placed in a ſtate totally different from that of the unrepreſented inhabitants of Great Britain, and who in fact are no ſufferers by the privation of the right of repreſentation. The two caſes then are wholly different; and would miniſtry have ſupported the ſemblance of analogy between them, it became at leaſt incumbent on them to prove that there is ſome large diſtrict in Great Britain, ſome county, to ſay nothing leſs, the numerous inhabitants of which were in no reſpect repreſented in the parliament of Great Britain, and yet were taxed by that parliament. I ſay the ſemblance of analogy, for it would be no more; becauſe, could this be proved, it would not avail them unleſs they could likewiſe prove that the peculiar ſtate in which a part of a kingdom happens to be, is that very ſtate in which the whole ought to be; and this would be ſaying that the parliament of Great Britain ought to be appointed without conſtituents, and without members who were repreſentatives of the people.

But, to return to the Americans, the neceſſity of diſtinct acts of the Legiſlature for America

America ſolely, and neither their perſons nor their property being intermixed with thoſe of their neighbours who are repreſented, and which would be to them as a ſhield and palladium againſt violence and oppreſſion, are circumſtances, which, together with a total privation of repreſentation, might lay open a wide breach for every ſpecies of rapine to ruſh in upon them, and to exerciſe its fury with impunity, and without redreſs, ſhould it ſo happen in future time, that a legiſlature diſſimilar from the preſent, ſhould diveſt itſelf of integrity, to aſſume in its ſtead corruption and avarice. There is beſides another circumſtance formidable in itſelf, and pregnant with terror to the Americans if the Britiſh Legiſlature is to poſſeſs the power of taxing them unrepreſented; for in ſuch caſe the party taxing, contrary to all rule where deſpotiſm prevails not, is itſelf exempt from every part of the burthen laid on. Nor is this all, the impropriety extends ſtill further, for every tax laid on the Americans by the Britiſh Legiſlature, would be a proportionable diminution of their own; which are powerful motives to induce them not to be over ſcrupulous in the article of American taxation, unleſs we can ſuppoſe that ſelf-intereſt, accompanied with plauſible reaſons at leaſt for promoting it, is leſs predominant in the breaſts of mankind than the experience

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of each day fatally proves it to be. It is evident therefore that the inhabitants of America unrepreſented, and yet under the power of taxation by the Britiſh parliament, are not in a parallel ſtate or condition with the unrepreſented inhabitants of Great Britain; inaſmuch as the latter are as ſecure in their property as though they were repreſented; and that the former for want of repreſentation, become expoſed to every ſpecies of oppreſſion: and in worſe times than ours may be reduced to the like ſtate with the Sicilians of whom Cicero emphatically ſays, "That though they were the "allies of the Romans, they had not the "liberty left them even of lamenting their wrongs," * *Hoc jure ſunt ſocii, utiis ne deplorare quidem de ſuis incommodis liceat.*

Thus falls to the ground this formidable argument of miniſtry; I ſay it is the argument of miniſtry, and am convinced it is the moſt formidable they have, becauſe it cannot be ſuppoſed they would give their worſt; and becauſe it is an argument they publicly ſupport, for ſpeaking with a view to the Americans, and condemning their conduct as contrary to reaſon, they tell us in unlimited terms, that "To be a ſubject "of Great Britain with all its conſequences,

* Cic. in Verr.

"is

" is to be the freeſt member of any civil " ſociety in the known world." But this propoſition requires an explication, unleſs we mean to be contented to take mere ſounds for ſubſtance. I will however readily agree to it ſo far as it concerns *a ſubject reſident in Great Britain:* and for this, we are not indebted to any miniſtry; the ſole merit of the bleſſing is due to the public virtue, firmneſs, and courage of our anceſtors. But if the parliament of Great Britain have a right to make laws which are binding on the Americans, this aſſertion will not hold good with reſpect to them. I would aſk, how it comes to paſs that a ſubject of Great Britain, and there reſident, is the freeſt member of any civil ſociety? It is certainly becauſe the powers of legiſlation and taxation are in the hands of the people: the people not only propound, but deſcribe and enact their own laws, by their repreſentatives in parliament; ſo that in fact they obey no laws but their own, or in other words they obey no will but their own, and this is the ſummit of political freedom; they pay no tax which they have not laid upon themſelves, and they ſubmit to no laws which they have not made for themſelves: and therefore it is, that a ſubject of Great Britain, *and there reſident*, is the freeſt member of any civil ſociety in the known world. But if the Americans are not repreſented in that parliament

liament which enacts their laws; and that parliament enacts ſeparate laws for the Americans, which muſt neceſſarily be done; laws, which the Americans have neither propounded, deſcribed nor enacted, nor have had any part or ſhare therein, ſurely their ſituation in point of liberty and freedom is juſt the reverſe of that of Britiſh ſubjects reſident in Great Britain! Under theſe circumſtances, I ſee not how they can be called free ſubjects by others, nor arrogate freedom to themſelves; they are taxed by others without the concurrence of their own act or will; and they make not their own laws, nor have they any ſhare in the making of them, and theſe are the characteriſtic and criterion of freedom.

Deprived therefore of theſe divine rights (if from their eminence I may ſo call them) enjoyed by Britons, which alone conſtitute freedom; and bound by laws made by others, and particularly levelled at them, they become ſubjected to the will of others, inſtead of their own; and thus their property, liberty, and whatever beſide is held deareſt by mankind, is like a forlorn hope, ſubmitted to the ſame will, and left entirely at the diſcretion and diſpoſal of another*.

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* Freedom conſiſts in not being ſubjected to the will and power of another, *Sui juris ſunt omnes qui non ſunt in aliena poteſtate*, ſays Cowel. And where another has the diſpoſal of your property without your acquieſcence, this

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No man, I preſume, will call this a ſtate of freedom; it is ſuch, I am convinced, as Engliſhmen will not be ſatisfied with for themſelves; former ſtruggles with the crown plainly evince it; and the troubles excited in the reign of Charles the Firſt are a convincing proof of it. The cauſe of conteſt with that unhappy miſguided Prince was evidently this, and nothing more; To ſecure to the People the right of making for themſelves thoſe laws by which they were to be governed, and the right of laying that taxation upon themſelves which they themſelves were to pay. This was the great cauſe undertaken againſt that Prince by the people; it was vigorouſly carried on, and as happily concluded; and without which, I may venture to affirm, there had been an end to liberty in this Kingdom. If this be ſo, with what juſtice or humanity can we wiſh to involve our fellow ſubjects in America in the like diſtreſs and difficulty, from which our anceſtors nobly extricated themſelves and us at the expence of ſome of the beſt blood in the nation, and even at the hazard of the conſtitution itſelf?

is being in a ſtate of ſervitude, and is ſo deſcribed by the old lawyers Bracton, Fleta; and Cowel from them ſays, *Quia quandoque placuerit domino, auferre poterit villano ſuo wainagium ſuum, et omnia ſua bona.* The diſtinction then, as far as concerns property, between a freeman and a ſlave is this: The freeman has the diſpoſal of his own property; the ſlave, if he has any property, it is at the diſpoſal of his lord. *Cowelle Inſt. Lib.* 2 *Tit.* 8. *Sect.* 2.

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If therefore, miniſtry will not allow that there is reaſon or juſtice in the cauſe which the Americans have eſpouſed, they might have had the feelings of humanity at leaſt for their juſt apprehenſions in a caſe ſo momentous to them, and their poſterity. If, ſay the Americans, there be a power in the parliament of Great Britain to tax us at pleaſure, without our conſent, and without repreſentation, we are reduced from free men to a level with the ſubjects of France and Spain; we are on the very footing of the ſlaves of a deſpotic prince; for the parliament of Great Britain is that to us, which their princes are to them; the two powers differ only in name, in their effects and conſequences they are exactly ſimilar, as like to each other as the water of the Mediterranean ſea is to that of the Britiſh ocean. We have no will in the choice of the members who form this power; our intereſts in many reſpects are not only alien and ſeparate from theirs, but their intereſt is founded on, and promoted by our ſufferings; for the higher we are taxed, the more are they who tax us alleviated by the taxation. Having no ſhare in conſtituting any part of this power, all its actions are unconnected with and independent of our will; we are deſtitute of all reſtraint upon it, and are left for ever without any legal means of redreſs under all oppreſſions that may befal us. The power being

being unlimited, the oppreſſion may be correſpondent with the power; a deſpotiſm is erected; and it is immaterial to us whether we ſuffer by the imperious will of one man, or whether the wills of five hundred are the cauſe of our ruin.—An aſſumed power is unlimited and exceſſive, and under ſuch power neither the perſon nor the property of the ſubject is ſecure; but a delegated and conſtituted power is circumſcribed either with reſpect to action, to the duration of that power, or to both: theſe are reſtraints which are not attendant on aſſumed power. Reſpecting us, this is an aſſumed and unlimited power, though it be otherwiſe on the part of Great Britain; and therefore we have every thing to apprehend from it. If it be ſaid, we foreſee terrors not likely to happen; we anſwer, a delegated power is ever circumſcribed not ſo much with a view to what the party *will* do, as to what it *might* do were that reſtraint wanting. We have no ſhare in appointing members of the Britiſh parliament; we have no reſtraint upon them when conſtituted; no ties of intereſt to attach us to their favour; our country very remote from theirs, and the intereſts of each, as far at leaſt as concerns taxation, claſh and ſtand at variance the one with the other. Thus circumſtanced, abandoned to the ſole diſpoſal of the Britiſh Legiſlature, what is to be our condition! We are not on

a footing with Britiſh ſubjects; ours is a ſtate of ſlavery: and that integrity, that juſtice, that equity which they have a right to expect and demand at the hands of their repreſentatives, muſt be conſtrued, whenever extended towards us, into acts of tenderneſs, lenity, and mercy vouchſafed from a power deſpotic over us, and conſequently under no obligation to confer ſuch benefits.

Thus ſtands the reaſoning on the part of America, in oppoſition to the argument of miniſtry. And I have dwelt the longer upon it, becauſe as the Americans have not retracted from, but perſiſted in adhering firmly to theſe principles, miniſtry have thought proper to denounce war againſt them. We have then plainly before us the cauſe of this war, and its merits; a war, that muſt be attended with the moſt fatal conſequences, and this, in preference to either of the other modes of proceeding. Not to aſſume the privilege of determining for others on the juſtneſs and propriety of this reaſoning of the Americans, certain it is, they conſider their whole liberty to be at ſtake; and in that caſe they cannot appeal to better judges of their cauſe than the people of England. When I ſay the people of England, I would not be underſtood to mean, or include, a miniſtry, a ſecret junto, or any body of men, or detached individuals who proſtitute, profeſſionally as it were, their conſciences

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for gain; who ſubſiſt on court favours diſperſed among them from the purſes of the public, and who from ſuch motives are ever ready to embrace any opinions to which their intereſt may direct them, while their unfeigned devotion to venality mark them as diſgraceful members of that community to which they belong: ſuch men, I ſay, are too contemptible to be appealed to on a ſubject of this importance. It is the unprejudiced, unbiaſſed, and diſintereſted part of the public who can be ſuppoſed the only competent judges in the preſent caſe, whoſe minds are unwarped by prejudices or intereſt, and will not permit mean ſiniſter views to have any weight in the deciſion. The cauſe includes the public or civil liberty of a whole people; with them, all is here at ſtake. And who are ſo good judges of this liberty as the people of England, who enjoy it in greater perfection than thoſe of any other nation whatever, and who have bought it at a price that muſt have been deemed extravagant for the purchaſe of any other ſublunary advantage whatever? Where then can adequate judges be found in a cauſe where the deareſt rights and intereſts of mankind are in queſtion, if the appeal be not made to the public of England? Here, a difference in religious ſentiments will have no weight, nor will the country of thoſe people who make their appeal tend to warp

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the firmneſs of their judgment. Adminiſtration in moſt countries, eſpecially in ſuch as are deſpotic, blend religion with civil polity, and by mixing and interweaving them together make an engine from that connection ſubſervient to their power and ambition. But the public of England will diſcriminate better than to ſuffer themſelves to be ſo duped in the preſent caſe; they will make the true diſtinction between religion, and the rights of mankind; and will determine that mankind are not to be diveſted of their natural rights, be their religion, or their country what it may. They will perceive that the queſtion here, is not whether the appellants be Americans, Aſiatics, French or Germans; or whether in point of religion they be Diſſenters, Mahometans, Papiſts or Lutherans; all which circumſtances are foreign to the purpoſe where the rights of mankind are the point in agitation. They know as honeſt men, that it is an indiſpenſable obligation on every one, and conſequently on them as Engliſhmen, and though they be of the Church of England, to promote and ſecure, where it may fairly be done, the rights of mankind to Americans although they be Diſſenters; to Aſiatics although they be Mahometans; to Frenchmen although they be Papiſts; and to Germans although they be Lutherans. The country, and the religion of the people here

in queſtion, have then nothing to do in the preſent deciſion: a particular climate, the ceremonies of a church, or the different modes of religious faith, are not here under examination; they are all foreign and heterogeneous to the preſent purpoſe; and the only object before us is, the rights of mankind, and whether through our means they ought to be deſpoiled of, or ſupported in them.

Of this, I ſay, the public of England are the beſt judges, becauſe they know too well the value of that liberty they have purchaſed by their anceſtors, to ſport with it in the caſe of others, and therefore cannot be ſuppoſed to give a wrong judgment; and again, becauſe whatever is effected, cannot be done but by their aſſiſtance; ſince no war can be carried on, by whomſoever undertaken, but by the means of their treaſures: ſo that it remains entirely with the public whether peace ſhall take place, or war ſhall be ſupported, that is, continued. However this may be determined, yet I may ſay, if there be two or three millions of perſons on the ſame continent, and that theſe are almoſt unanimous in an opinion, and upon mature deliberation cannot avoid thinking as they do; ſhould they regulate their actions in conſequence thereof, this ſurely can never make them the deſerving objects of all the vengeance miniſtry can pour upon them by every

every miſery attendant on a moſt cruel and deſtructive war! If they have no pity for the Americans, they might at leaſt have ſome tenderneſs for us! Are we to be called forth at every fit of caprice and humour in miniſtry to waſte our blood and conſume our property, and this before all other means of an equitable and juſt reconciliation have been attempted? If the Americans judge wrong, it is eaſy by reaſoning to convince them of their error; and reaſon, not war, is the proper application to rational creatures. If the Americans judge right, then are they blameleſs: why then is recourſe had to war? Or are truth and juſtice, in this caſe, enveloped in ſuch impervious darkneſs that the reaſon of man cannot pervade it? If ſo, then this ſudden immerging ourſelves into war is raſh and precipitate, and the certain and indubitable juſtice of the cauſe, which alone can authorize war, is uncertain and indeterminate. If it cannot be determined that they are wrong, neither can it be determined that miniſtry are in the right; and in defiance of every perſuaſive influence, this nation is at leaſt divided in opinion on the matter.— Men who are conſcious they have the worſt of the argument, decline reaſoning, and have recourſe to blows; and miniſtry, after their example, reject reaſon, and aſſume the ſword; then follow violence and rapine un-

 reſtrained,

reſtrained, though no ways conducive to the main end and deſign: and thus the war is now proſecuting under their auſpices along the ſea-coaſts of America, where their inoffenſive and defenceleſs little towns and villages are fired, the inhabitants deſtroyed, and deſolation marks the deſtructive ruin of the grand and awful navy of Great Britain as far as its ſhips can proceed. What a piratical employment for a navy which ſhould awe the world, and give law to the real enemies of Britain! If the Americans entertained ſuſpicions of the juſtice and moderation of miniſtry in caſe they had acquieſced in all the terms required, this manner of making war upon them will be judged deciſive of that clemency they were to expect, had they fallen even with the moſt abject ſubmiſſion at their feet. And what an idea muſt they entertain of men who, under the pretence of eſtabliſhing peace and ſecurity, commit murther and rapine, and plunder and deſolate wherever they go; *auferre, trucidare, rapere falſis nominibus, imperium; atque ubi ſolitudinem faciunt ibi pacem appellant**.

If neither humanity, nor a predilection for juſtice could prevail on miniſtry to decline adopting this ſanguinary meaſure, war; good policy ought however to have

* *Tacitus, in V. Agricolæ.*

deferred

deterred them from it. They might have been acquainted with the force of education; they might have known that minds adorned and enriched with ſentiments of liberty, and breaſts panting after it with more avidity than thoſe of heroes after fame, are objects neither of cruelty, nor of contempt. They might have known the Americans are principally the deſcendants of Britons, who were remarked even by antiquity as a people formidable in reſenting injuries, however eaſily wrought into compliance when their liberty was not affected by it,—*Ipſi Britanni delectum, ac obeunt tributa, et injuncta imperii munera impigre, ſi injuriæ abſint: has ægre tolerant, jam domiti ut pareant, nondum ut ſerviant**. They might have known that there cannot be an act more injurious, than by oppreſſion to drive a whole people into rebellion, and then to puniſh them for ſuch reſiſtance. That when a generous people are once rouſed to take up arms in defence of their liberties, courage inſpired by liberty, like electrical fire, catches from breaſt to breaſt: and that war when once blown into a flame, is as contagious as an epidemical diſeaſe; with what fury it may rage, how far it may ex-

* *Tacitus, in V. Agric. cap.* 13.

tend, what it may conſume, and when it ſhall ceaſe, are known only to the omniſcience of Heaven.

The Americans, as deſcendants of Britons, are ſtrongly attached to their own legiſlatures, and with good reaſon; for the conſtitution of America in King, councils, and aſſemblies, is conſonant to the conſtitution of England. They are too ſenſible of the advantages derived to them from ſuch a conſtitution, to give it up in exchange for any other mode of government whatever. An attempt to force them to a compliance hath raiſed a general ferment, and put all America in arms, which nothing is likely to appeaſe, but gentleneſs, moderation, and juſtice. Vengeance, eſpouſed by miniſtry, is oil to the flame, which, without the acceſſion of ſo powerful an excitement, was of itſelf too fierce to be quenched by any engines of miniſtry on thoſe principles. A numerous people inſulted, and deprived of their rights, will become under all diſadvantages a formidable adverſary; and if they have ſeventy thouſand well diſciplined troops ready to take the field immediately, as the Americans have, and as many more who can ſhortly be muſtered, I ſee not with miniſtry, what expectations of advantage are to be derived from war with ſuch a people, and in ſuch a cauſe. Spain was once in poſſeſſion of the Netherlands; being

ing oppreſſed, they revolted, and threw off the Spaniſh yoke; nor could ſhe recover again the dominion of the Netherlands, though Spain was at that time the moſt powerful monarchy in Europe. *Les Hollandois ne ſe ſeroient jamais révoltés contre les Eſpagnols ſi la tyrannie des Eſpagnols n'étoit parvenue à un excés ſi énorme, que les Hollandois ne pouvoient devenir plus malheureux:* Anti-Machiavel, ch. 2. *Il a ſecoüé le joug de la domination Eſpagnole, qui étoit alors la monarchie la plus formidable de l'Europe.* ch. 5. If ſo ſmall, ſo weak a people, but inſpired with liberty, made ſo glorious an achievement againſt oppreſſion and the whole force of the Spaniſh monarchy, we may draw a very rational concluſion from thence, that at the cloſe of the preſent war, when my countrymen ſhall become ruined by the weight of taxes exacted from them in ſupport of it, and the nation exhauſted of its reſources both in men and money, we may then compare notes with the Spaniſh monarchy; or at beſt, make terms which might now be agreed on without an effuſion of blood and waſte of treaſure; and without riſking the loſs of America for ever.

But war is the cry, miniſtry are determined upon it; becauſe they themſelves feel not the ſcourges of war. They ſit ſecure, at once removed both from its dangers and

and ſufferings; and the emolument of their places renders them inſenſible of the burthen to be ſuffered by the people in ſupport of it. To them it is no more than a tranſient dream, and the deepeſt of its wounds leaves not ſo much as a trace either on memory or conſcience. They are conſcious of not having a perpetuity in the office they hold; that they are only mere tenants of the day; they prepare againſt the evil hour in which they ſhall be turned out; and therefore to breed confuſion is favourable to their deſigns, as it gives them an opportuity to ſcramble for more, and to carry it away with leſs riſk of a diſcovery. Were not this the caſe, ſome attention might have been paid to a ſcheme for the total rejection of the Americans, rather than to involve us in a war with them, which cannot fail of being highly injurious to theſe kingdoms, let the event of this war be what it will. It hath been much doubted, and with good reaſon, whether the retaining of America, even upon any terms, can be beneficial to theſe kingdoms. It hath not yet been made appear, that coloniſation is favourable to Great Britain; much leſs to continue America as a colony whoſe extent of territory is immenſe; and this, at the diſtance of three thouſand miles. Before war had been undertaken againſt America, it ought firſt to have

have been clearly proved, that America as a colony, every circumſtance conſidered, is an abſolute advantage to this nation; and next, that this advantage was poſitively ſuch as would more than indemnify us for the loſs ſuſtained by ſo expenſive and deſtructive a war. Till theſe points are ſettled beyond the poſſibility of a doubt, we are fighting without knowing what we contend for; we are acting the part of a madman who in his phrenſy ſeizes on every opportunity to deſtroy himſelf, without knowing the reaſonableneſs or unreaſonableneſs of the motive on which he acts, or being conſcious of the violence of that diſorder which hurries him along.

If the two laſt wars with France and Spain, which conſumed ſo much of our wealth, increaſed to ſo enormous a ſum our national debt, and laid ſuch a burthen of taxes upon us ever ſince, to the detriment of trade, and oppreſſion of the ſubject; if theſe, I ſay, were incurred*, as they certainly were, to promote the intereſt of the Ame-

* And moſt certain it is, that both the former *Spaniſh* (or the *No-Search*) War, and the latter *French* (or the *Acadia* and *Ohio*) War, were begun and carried on principally with a View to promote the immediate intereſts of the Northern Colonies. *Dean Tucker's Appeal to the Landed Intereſt*, p. 14.

ricans;

ricans; and annual† ſums to a conſiderable amount have been granted from hence, as bounties on ſundry of their articles of commerce: ſurely their rejection is an object well deſerving the attention of every impartial perſon in theſe kingdoms, if we mean either to live in peace with our neighbours, or prevent our ruin by an accumulated load of national debt. As their diſputes formerly forced us into wars with France and Spain, the like no doubt will in future be reiterated; and let them pay what part of the expence they can, we well know the heavieſt ſhare, nay almoſt the whole burthen of the war muſt and will fall to our lot.—Every diſpute with foreign powers, and brought on by the Americans, muſt be carried on and decided in Europe; and the matter to furniſh theſe conteſts is ſo various and abundant, that we ſhall by their means be involved almoſt perpetually in war; and this the rather, as the party in whoſe defence it is undertaken, and who is the cauſe

† And as to Indigo had it not been for the many Hundred Thouſands of Pounds ſterling, which Great Britain has granted in Bounties and Premiums to promote the Culture of this article in the *Carolinas* and *Virginia*, &c. Id. p. 56.—And others when imported from *America*, are not only allowed to be imported duty free, which is juſt enough; but alſo have enjoyed for many years, the benefit of large and munificent Bounties given by the Parliament of *Great-Britain*. Id. ib. p. 55, ſee alſo p. 56.

of

of the difference, will bear ſo ſmall a proportion of the expence: and this admits of no remedy, for I am inclined to think however willing they might be to contribute largely, their inability as an infant ſtate, or at beſt, far ſhort of maturity, would be a ſufficient plea in their behalf. Thus would their contraband commerce at all times be furniſhing cauſe of contention; and as we muſt as conſtantly come forward and ſtand forth the principal actor in every tragical ſcene of the theatre of war, we ſhall, having the adverſary at our very gates, be ruined as a commercial kingdom within the ſpace of a century, from the neceſſity of giving them that protection by which alone they can be ſecured to us, while the ſufferings of the Americans will, from their low eſtate, be almoſt imperceptible; for he that hath nothing to loſe, can hardly be reduced to a lower condition; and he that hath much to loſe, by loſing that, is ruined. And thus we ſhall at the ſame time feel the fatal effects of a decreaſing commerce, and the accumulating load of national debt, which will create ſuch an enormous burthen of taxes, without having the means of paying them, that in the end it will be found the only relief under ſuch difficulties will be a general failure of public credit, which though a neceſſary, muſt be the dreadful alternative! In ſhort, the funds from their foundations muſt break up, and the

the ſufferings of individuals muſt become the ſacrifice to compenſate for, and to avert a general, a public, and univerſal ruin.

Theſe are ſome of the fatal effects likely to reſult to Great Britain from ſupporting America as a colony. The two laſt wars in which we were engaged on account of America*, it is ſaid, coſt us one hundred and fifty millions ſterling. How is Great Britain to be reimburſed this ſum alone? What adequate compenſation can be expected from America, even ſuppoſing it now, and without further expence, ſubjugated to the will of miniſtry? No man I preſume will judge it capable of paying off this ſole debt and intereſt within a century, and perhaps not in two. During which period, if we are to protect it at a rate proportionable to what has been already expended in its defence, what will it not coſt us ſuppoſing we were able to bear the expence? But leſt theſe contingents ſhould not accelerate our ruin with that expedition which ſeems to be re-

* In the former Spaniſh (or *no-ſearch*) war, you ſpent above ſixty millions ſterling, including the extraordinary ſums raiſed, and the freſh debts contracted:——And the laſt, *French, Ohio*, or *Acadia* War, you ſpent above Ninety millions ſterling, if computed after the ſame manner.—*Dean Tucker's Appeal to the Landed Intereſt*, p. 20.—— And Lord Cheſterfield ſays, "Upon the whole, then, the acquiſition of Canada has coſt us fourſcore millions ſterling." Letter 328.

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quired by ſome people, we are now led into an expenſive and ruinous war againſt theſe very Americans for whoſe protection ſuch large ſums have been ſo laviſhly ſquandered away. If from the event of war they are to remain a colony of Great Britain, this American war, in all probability, will be no ſooner concluded, than we ſhall have a French and Spaniſh war again upon our hands for their protection. War ſeems to be the favourite object of miniſtry, but the object of a commercial Nation ſhould be peace, becauſe peace introduces riches and plenty, while the attendants on war are deſolation and beggary. But inſtead of peace, we ſeem to be in a fair way of dancing the round from one war to another without any reſpite. In the interim it is by no means certain, or even probable, notwithſtanding the pretended ſecurity of miniſtry, that we ſhall not be engaged in an American, French, and Spaniſh war at the ſame time. The good faith and promiſes of Princes when it becomes their intereſt to break through and cancel them, is upon record; and the weakneſs of relying on, or giving credit to ſuch flattering tales, wholly inexcuſable. They have either a natural propenſity to the precept laid down by Machiavel, or a wonderful aptitude for learning it. Let us attend to what the great political teacher advances on this ſubject: "Every man knows how

"honour-

" honourable it is in a Prince to keep his " word and good faith inviolable, and to " maintain his integrity. Our times, how- " ever, have furniſhed us with ſtriking ex- " amples to prove that thoſe Princes have " ſucceeded beſt, who have not been over " ſcrupulous herein, but have had recourſe " to deceit and artifice; and that in the " concluſion theſe have always gained the " ſuperiority and advantage over ſuch as " made a profeſſion and practice of honour " and good faith."——" A prudent " Prince, therefore ought not to confine " himſelf to his faith and promiſe whenever " the obſervance of them makes againſt his " intereſt, or that the cauſes no longer ſub- " ſiſt which brought on ſuch engagements. " True it is, if men were honeſt, this pre- " cept would be naught; but as mankind " are in general knaves, and will forfeit their " word with you, therefore you are under " no obligation to keep yours with them: " and a Prince can never be at a loſs for a " good plea on ſuch occaſions." *Quanto ſia laudabile in uno Principe mantinere la fide, e vivere con integrita, e non con aſtutia, ciaſcuno lo intende. Nondimeno ſe vede per iſperienza ne noſtri tempi quelli principi haver fatto gran coſe, che della fide hanno tenuto poco conto, & che hanno ſaputo con aſtutia aggirare li cervelli de gli huomini, & alla fine hanno ſuperato quelli che ſi ſono fondati in ſu la lealta.*——*Non*

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*puo per tanto un Signor prudente, ne debbe oſſervare la fide, quanto tal oſſervantia gli torni contro, e che ſono ſpente le cagioni che la fecen promettere; & ſi gli huomini fuſſeno tutti buoni, queſto precetto non ſaria buono, ma perche ſono triſti, & non l'oſſerverebbono a te, tu ancora non l'hai da oſſervar a loro, ne mai ad un Principe mancarono cagioni legitime di colorare l'inoſſervanza.** And again, " A certain Prince of " our time†, whom it is not proper to " mention by name, was ever recommend- " ing peace and good faith in all his diſ- " courſe; but had he adhered to them in " practice, he would have been infallibly " ſtripped both of his kingdom and his re- " putation." *Alcun Principe di queſti tempi il quale non e ben nominare, non predica mai altro che pace, & fide, & l'una & l'altro quando l'haveſſe oſſervata, gli havrebbe piu volte tolto lo ſtato, & la riputatione‡.* With what caution then ought we to proceed in this American war; if we ought to proceed at all? And what regard is due in ſo momentous a mat-

* Il Prin. di Machiavelli. cap. 18.

† He alludes to Ferdinand, King of Caſtile and of Arragon, who by perfidy and treachery conquered the kingdoms of Naples and Navarre.

‡ Machiav. ut ſuprà.

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ter to the good faith and promiſes, which men think they are in ſome meaſure juſtified in the breach of, both from cuſtom and precept, whenever favourable opportunities ſhall preſent themſelves.

But let us ſuppoſe in favour of miniſtry that neither France nor Spain are capable of perfidy or treachery; let us ſuppoſe too that both are inſenſible to their own intereſts, and that of their ſubjects; and laſtly let us ſuppoſe (as we are in the humour for ſuppoſing any thing, however inconſiſtent it may be) that an unuſual ſqueamiſhneſs of conſcience ſhall induce them to a ſtrict obſervance of their promiſe, and an implicit adherence to good faith, in preference to all other conſiderations and political advantages. This is granting, it is true, more than any opponent can deſire or expect; more than reaſon, experience, or the nature of the thing can poſſibly admit of: yet, all this granted, the American war is ſtill certain; and as certain will be the burthen of taxes upon the people to defray the expence of it.— This is a miniſterial, not a national war; and it is ſo through our own fault; and the people muſt be contented to bear the conſequences. We ſhall do well therefore to contemplate them beforehand, that when they come ruſhing like a deluge upon us, we may be in ſome degree prepared to bear

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up againſt our misfortunes. If America is to continue to be a colony of Great Britain, it is evident no limits can be preſcribed to our waſte of blood and treaſure in ſupport of it: At peace, or at war with America, there is no truce nor reſpite from charge and expence on its account. For if we are at war with it, we muſt certainly bear the expence of that war; if at peace, then its premiums and bounties come into queſtion, and what is more inſufferable, its protection; for this will neceſſarily lead us into perpetual wars with France and Spain: the principal part of which burthen muſt be laid on our ſhoulders, if not the whole of it, by reaſon of the debilitated ſtate in which the preſent war will leave America, ſuppoſing we become victorious. Thus, at peace or at war with America, it matters not which, ſo long as it remains a colony, we muſt be ſufferers by its continuing ſuch; and the reiterated wars we ſhall be engaged in with France and Spain, will drain the very vitals of the people of landed property in this kingdom, and at the ſame time give ſo torpid a check to commerce, that even the moſt flouriſhing ſtate would not be able to bear up againſt ſuch weighty calamities. An occaſional war may be ſubmitted to, and it may perhaps be conſiſtent with good policy on particular occaſions to engage in it; but for a Nation whoſe profeſſion is not war, like that of the Romans, but commerce;

for ſuch a Nation, I ſay, to be ever puſhing itſelf forward into war, or ſo to plan its meaſures that they muſt of neceſſity promote it; this, ſeems to me, the height of indiſcretion and folly.

To be *ſucceſsful* in this American war, be it ever ſo ruinous and expenſive, is nothing more than receiving a ſure and certain pledge of a variety of endleſs expence in future. But we are engaged in it; miniſtry will not retract; and as it is an object of the higheſt importance to this nation, it certainly demands the attention of every man of reflection in it. The event of war is doubtful, but our ruin ſeems not to be ſo; that is placed on a more deſperate footing. If ſucceſsful, we *muſt* be ruined: if unſucceſsful, we *may* be ruined. A long war with the Americans will reduce us to a ſtate of weakneſs hitherto unknown; and if victory inclines at length for us, it will only inſure to us future burthens and expences, future broils with France and Spain; and America will be ſo debilitated by the ſhock, that ſhe muſt fall back into her primitive ſtate: Weak and unable to make any efforts, ſhe muſt be nurſed and nurtur'd up anew, the burthen and expence of which, is to fall once more upon Great Britain; who, muſt become again a ſufferer, not only by perpetrating the violence, but afterwards, by repairing the injuries that violence hath occaſioned: And how is all this

this to be borne?—If at the cloſe of a long war we are unſucceſsful, and this may probably be the caſe, what will be our condition? I will not deſcribe it; let every one repreſent to his own mind a nation exhauſted of men and money in a fruitleſs war; ſuppoſe the evil preſent; and let him aſk himſelf, what will then be the temper of the people, and how they are to be pacified? whether ſome convulſion may not follow this miniſterial war, into which the impartial uninfluenced Public have been reluctantly forced? and what compenſation may not the people, driven to deſperation and deſpair, demand, and ſeek in their frantic rage, as an atonement for ſo profuſe a waſte of blood and treaſure? It may be anſwered, perhaps, (conformable to a late mode of proceeding near this Metropolis) that the militia ſhall ſatisfy them. But the militia may be otherwiſe employed; weak, languid, enervated, exhauſted of men and treaſure, as this Nation will then be, it is not poſſible to imagine that our natural enemies, will, under theſe circumſtances, give us any reſpite, whatever they may do till then: France and Spain have an intereſt in our ruin, and they would certainly improve ſo promiſing an opportunity to effect it. The militia muſt be called forth to repel the invaders, in which enterprize their proweſs might be wholly employed. Moreover the ſentiments of one

corps of militia are not to determine the ſenſe of the militia of the whole kingdom on the preſent war. There are other counties whoſe militia do by no means coincide in ſentiment on this point, with the militia of that county which has addreſſed. That corps, it is true, hath ſet the example, an example pernicious and dangerous enough, for obvious reaſons, and as ſuch it muſt be eſteemed in the opinions of the militia throughout the kingdom, as I do not hear that any of them have as yet thought it reaſonable or prudent to follow ſo bold a precedent. And there may be cauſe to ſurmiſe, that before this American war is brought to a concluſion, that good reaſons will offer to induce this militia to wiſh they had not been altogether ſo precipitate in the meaſure. Some ſingular advantages ought to reſult to the people from the militia; we feel it in general onerous, but every perſon reſident in the country knows it is attended with no ſmall additional inconveniences; the Public, however, are content to ſubmit to the eſtabliſhment, in this confidence, that whenever they ſhall be called upon by their country, they will reſolutely defend and ſupport it, together with its juſt rights and liberties, againſt every invader; and nobly acquit themſelves at the ſame time of their duties both as citizens, and as ſoldiers. On this conſideration alone is a militia ſupportable; this removed, inſupportable

portable and intolerable; and muſt be conſidered as an engine in the pay of the people, but in the power of miniſtry for the ſole purpoſe of eſtabliſhing deſpotiſm on the ruins of freedom and liberty.

But to return to this American war, which affords nothing better than an unbounded proſpect of diſaſter and deſolation, without being attended with one benignant ray of utility or public good to animate any part of the whole ſcene. As yet, Victory makes not her appearance; and when that ſhall happen, ſhe may hover awhile on each ſide of the Atlantic, before ſhe makes her pauſe. It is as uncertain *when*, as it is *where*, ſhe will at laſt take her ſtand. If we may be allowed to judge from that enthuſiaſm with which the Americans have eſpouſed their cauſe, and which in war fails not to inſpire with the moſt undaunted courage, and conſequently no contemptible object in the preſent caſe: If we may form any idea of the abilities of their generals from their ſpecimens of their conduct near Boſton, and in Canada: If we may be permitted to reaſon from the number of their forces already in arms, their good diſcipline, equal at leaſt to the raw levies, and foreign mercenaries ſent againſt them; and the thouſands equally good they ſtill withhold from the field; if we conſider the advantages they derive from climate,

nature of the country, and their ſuperior knowledge of it; our remote diſtance from them; and our diviſions at home, to which they oppoſe an unſhaken and invincible unanimity; I ſay, if we may be intitled to argue from theſe combined circumſtances ſo favourable to their cauſe, not to mention a multiplicity of others which cannot fail of ſuggeſting themſelves to the mind of every one of us, can we ſuppoſe, even under the moſt flattering ſeries of events, that we have not entered upon a war likely to prove of long continuance, that will probably be protracted for a number of years, and conſequently highly injurious to theſe kingdoms? We have to contend with men who in this conteſt conſider their all to be at ſtake; we have to cope with neither French nor Spaniard, but the deſcendants of Britons, our anceſtors, and who no doubt will be as reſolute in battle as they were; they poſſeſs the ſame deſire for liberty, and liberty has ever inſpired men with the firmeſt courage; and to this they have added enthuſiaſm, which infallibly keeps up and ſupports the ſpirit of courage and perſeverance to the laſt; it is this, which makes heroes in war, and in civil life thoſe geniuſes we read of as ſtateſmen, philoſophers, poets and the like; and if we credit *Cicero*,

never

never did any * great genius exiſt who did not poſſeſs more or leſs of enthuſiaſm: *Nemo unquam vir magnus ſine aliquo afflatu divino fecit.* Nat. Deor. 2, 66. As tho' it were an emanation of the celeſtial power transfuſed into the minds of men to brighten and invigorate them for a ſeaſon, that the agent may be thereby enabled to compleat the buſineſs aſſigned him. Whether this be ſo, or not; let it be real, or imaginary; a fact, or a viſion; it is altogether immaterial in the preſent caſe: The Americans poſſeſs the enthuſiaſm, or think they do ſo; they have confidence in it, and the effect will be the ſame. Many of the antients, and particularly the Romans, did ſo before them, and numberleſs inſtances might be collected from their hiſtory in proof of it, and that it was as conſtantly attended with ſucceſs in battle, as on theſe occaſions they failed not to eſtabliſh victory in the ſlaughter of their enemies. And how much ſoever modern heroes may affect to deſpiſe the notion, and to treat it with contempt, while their own excellence, if any they have, conſiſts prin-

* And Milton either poſſeſſed this enthuſiaſm, or fancied that he did, when ſpeaking of the divine wiſdom, he ſays, B. 7. v. 29.

——————While thou
Viſiteſt my ſlumbers nightly, &c.

cipally

cipally in protracting a war to their emolument and profit; yet I will venture to ſay, that a people under this influence, is the moſt dangerous, becauſe the moſt deſperate enemy that can be attacked. And ſhould the Americans, under this influence, defeat our forces as often as they join battle with them, I muſt confeſs it would not ſurprize me; for it would be no more, nor even ſo much, as the French did under the like enthuſiaſm both at Orleans, Patay, and in every rencounter in that campaign, under the auſpices, conduct, inſpiration, or what you pleaſe of *Joan D'Arc*, or the Maid of Orleans in the year 1429: And this too, when the ſituation of their affairs was become almoſt deſperate, and our troops had been fluſhed with repeated ſucceſs, and every where victorious till the time of her public appearance, when ſhe inſpired the deſponding French army with an enthuſiaſm which totally turned the balance of war, gave them to ſurmount all difficulties, made them every where victorious over their conquerors, who were either deſtroyed or fled before her.

If it may not be admitted that this enthuſiaſm for liberty will entirely deſtroy our hopes of ſucceſs in America; at leaſt, the probability of its protracting the war, cannot be denied. This enthuſiaſm, this ſpirit for liberty is gone forth throughout that land,

land, and has affected each ſex, and all ages. The women are as much under its influence, as the men: and children who have yet to learn to ſpeak, liſp the word, LIBERTY, even in the remoteſt corners of that continent. If all this tends not immediately to victory, it tends at leaſt to firmneſs and reſolution to ſupport the conteſt; the conteſt ſupported the war is protracted; and this, I apprehend, will be attended with more fatal conſequence to Great Britain than a ſudden and total defeat and miſcarriage in the enterprize; as this will give a deciſive ſtroke to a conteſt greatly injurious to theſe kingdoms, but which will become much more ſo by the continuance of it. But ſetting aſide all extraordinary efforts on the part of the Americans, there is no reaſon to ſurmiſe this war will have a ſhort iſſue. Great Britain can bring no land forces againſt them with which they are not able to contend with one fourth part of their forces. It is not one defeat, nor ten, that can be deciſive of their fate; their armies can be reinforced immediately, upon the ſpot, as occaſion requires, and with as good troops as thoſe they loſt. When our Navy has finiſhed its plundering, pillaging, and burning, on their coaſts, there will be an end of its operations; the little injury it can do them more than this, is not worth naming. If our army marches into the country, it can be no ſupport to them, no

retreat

retreat for them; having the whole continent for enemies, the further they march inland, the more eaſily will all communication be cut off, and if they do not proceed forward, how are they to conquer? They muſt know, from the event of laſt year, that the Americans are not to be frightened by the bare appearance of troops ſent to their continent; and if they were not ſo laſt year, we may readily conclude they will not be ſo this, or the next, as they are better prepared for their reception. The want of fortified places is in favour of the natives, eſpecially when attended with an extent of country, for ſhould our army take from them an advantageous poſt, it may as eaſily be reduced to the neceſſity of quitting it, every thing around them is hoſtile, and all would conſpire to make them quit the poſſeſſion by a variety of means; nor can any thing of that kind be long tenable where the enemy is ſo greatly ſuperior in numbers. We can ſend no army to America ſufficient to make it bring forth all its troops into the field; and could we do this, we ſhould be miſtaken if we imagined it could reduce them to a ſtarving condition. Agriculture would be carried on nearly after the ſame manner it now is, as well as their manufactures; there is hardly any branch of either that could not be executed by men through age unfit for arms; by the women; and by youth yet immature

immature for ſervice; theſe would furniſh their troops with all the neceſſaries of life that warriors can require. As a ſubſtitute for ſpecie they have iſſued a paper credit; and perhaps without either, they might have been enabled to carry on the war. Specie is a neceſſary medium in foreign traffic; but with them, all foreign commerce will be cut off, or become inconſiderable; and therefore they have more ſpecie than theirs will require. And were they without it, as the war is domeſtic, it might poſſibly be carried on as the Indians do theirs, or as all countries originally did. Or could it not, yet by means of this paper credit which they have, and which anſwers in every mode of circulation among them the purpoſe of ſpecie, the war is not like to be diſcontinued for want of the latter.

Which way ſoever we turn our eyes, it is obvious we are threatened with the miſeries of a long war with a people whoſe poverty excludes us from making any repriſals for our loſſes; whoſe want of wealth has hitherto ſhielded them from luxury, its concomitant vices, and their enervating conſequences; and who are therefore better enabled to ſupport themſelves under fatigue, labour, and the almoſt intolerable ſeverities of war; and whoſe courage is equal, whoſe diſcipline is little if at all inferior, and whoſe numbers far exceed all the veteran troops, together

gether with the raw new levies, both foreign and domeſtic, that can be collected from all quarters, to be ſent againſt them: whilſt their generals in point of courage, conduct, and ability, (odious compariſons apart) would do honour to Great Britain itſelf. What do theſe united advantages portend, but a total defeat on our part; or a long protracted war, if we are able to bear up againſt them? For as to Ruſſian ſuccours, the Powers of Europe will not ſuffer them to be employed againſt America. No, ſay they, (with France at their head) like the Cadmean heroes deſtroy each other as faſt as you pleaſe; but we will have no Ruſſians introduced, to ſpare the ſlaughter of your own troops; or to improve theirs in the art of war; confine the war to yourſelves, we wiſh you to be humiliated, and this will effect it: whatever advantages you may propoſe to yourſelf from this Καδμεία νικη, ſhould any ariſe, we will ſedulouſly wait the opportunity of converting them to our emolument, and your loſs. But if you employ Ruſſian troops, your own will be kept in reſerve, and theſe may defeat our intended enterprize.

If therefore the government of Ruſſia were weak, or wicked enough, to let to hire thirty thouſand of its troops for this expedition, (and common report aſſerts ſuch a tender was made) they could not be accepted

cepted without engaging us in a war with the Powers of Europe: ſo that all reſources of this nature muſt either be renounced, or by accepting them we muſt be content with involving ourſelves in further difficulties. Moreover, it is almoſt incredible, (unleſs we give implicit faith to what * Lord Cheſterfield has advanced) that Ruſſia at any time made that offer, as it would be taking a meaſure at once both weak, and wicked; weak, becauſe that power hath ſo recently terminated a war wherein the loſs of its ſubjects has not been inconſiderable, and even before the commencement of that war its country was not nearly half peopled; to exhauſt then, and make a further ſacrifice of its inhabitants in a cauſe where it has no real intereſt or concern, inſtead of employing every mean of promoting population in its half peopled towns and wide extended deſerts, would be not only a weakneſs, but an unpardonable political error. As to the wickedneſs, it is a traffic which ſtands ſelf-condemned; the impropriety of it in a political, the inhumanity in a moral, and the uncharitableneſs in a religious view, are too ſtriking, and plead too powerfully againſt

* The Court of Peterſburg is beggarly, profuſe, greedy, and by no means ſcrupulous. Why ſhould we not ſlip in there and outbid them?—And if we bid handſomely, I do not believe the *bonne foi* of that Court would ſtand in the way. *Letter* 291.

a practice which on mere intuition would ſtand condemned, exploded, and execrated by every friend, and patron of mankind. "What! is the human ſpecies to be placed "on the level with dogs and bulls which are "let to hire for the fight? The inſtitution "of the military is for the defence of their "country, but the ends both of war and of "commerce are perverted when troops are "let to hire. We have been told that it is "unlawful to make a traffic with things "that are ſacred; And what is more ſacred "than the blood of men?" *L'inſtitution du ſoldat eſt pour la défence de la patrie; les loüer à d'autres, comme on vend des dogues et des taureaux pour le combat; c'eſt ce me ſemble pervertir à la fois le but du negoce et de la guerre. On dit qu'il n'eſt pas permis de vendre des choſes ſaintes, eh! qu'y a-til de plus ſacré que le ſang des hommes?* Anti-Machiavel, ch. ult.

We are then left to ourſelves to carry on and conclude the war, unleſs with the ſame raſhneſs with which it was undertaken we ſhall think proper to plunge ourſelves into further difficulties with the neighbour ſtates, like him who not ſatisfied with ſeeking revenge on a hornet which had ſtung him, incenſed the whole neſt, which ſurrounded and ſtung him to death. Here are two great evils ſet before us: War againſt America with our own ſtrength; or war againſt America and ſome of the ſtates of Europe at the

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ſame time, in conſequence of receiving foreign ſuccour. The leaſt of theſe two evils will be the taking the American war entirely upon ourſelves; and for theſe reaſons, becauſe in the end it will be leaſt expenſive; and may alſo prevent our being ſwallowed up by a general convulſion which might otherwiſe happen in Europe, while we were buſily engaged in proſecuting this American war. For ſhould we be attacked at the ſame time by France and Spain, in ſpite of our alliances, Great Britain and Hanover muſt go to the bottom, or the American war muſt be given up, that we may be enabled to defend ourſelves. In which caſe, America would loſe no time to improve its ſtrength by land and by ſea; and as an attempt has been made to deſtroy its liberty, no ſuccour could be expected from that quarter againſt our enemies, and we ſhall have no reaſon to complain if it does not join them to retaliate the injury. To act then with our ſole ſtrength againſt America, deſperate as the event will, I apprehend, determine it to be, is the only alternative; and this can flatter the moſt ſanguine expectations of thoſe who promote this war, with the hope of nothing more favourable than a protracted, and of courſe a ruinous war to theſe Kingdoms: for if our forces are not defeated, and ſhortly too, the contrary muſt rather be imputed to fortune

and

and accident than to any other cauſe, ſince from circumſtances in general, the advantage evidently preponderates on the ſide of America.

In the ſecond Punic war, Annibal marched with a powerful army into the heart of the Roman empire; and the conteſt on the part of the Romans was no longer for glory, but for ſafety and liberty. During the ſpace of eighteen years, for ſo long that war continued, neither Annibal could ſubdue the Romans, nor the Romans conquer Annibal. At length it is true the Romans were victorious; and the price of victory was almoſt their ruin: for ſo great had been their ſlaughter, that on a compariſon of the injuries each party had received, that which at laſt became victorious bore the ſtrongeſt marks of a conquered people, *Sed a deo cladium atrocitate terribilius, ut ſi quis conferat damna utriuſque populi, ſimilior victo ſit populus qui vicit*, ſays Florus. But Annibal though he had marched his army which was very powerful, almoſt over every part of the empire; though he was himſelf a moſt conſummate general, fortunate, and victorious in almoſt every enterprize and engagement; though he gained a complete victory with a dreadful ſlaughter of almoſt the whole of the Roman army at the firſt battle; and though many cities and provinces of the empire, ſubmitted to, declared for, and aſ-

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ſiſted him againſt the Romans, during the courſe of the war: yet, all he could accompliſh, and the ſum of his atchievement amounted only to this, that he had made a great ſlaughter of the enemy, ruined the country, protracted the war for the ſpace of eighteen years, and was at laſt obliged to withdraw his army, and retire to defend his own country. So ended this deſtructive expedition, even under the conduct of Annibal himſelf. But where are our Annibals to ſend againſt America? That Army, one half of which it was vainly, ignorantly, and ridiculouſly aſſerted would march in triumph from one extremity of that continent to the other, what has it performed? Could any thing be more weak in its operations, excepting only the judgment of thoſe who promiſed us ſo much from it, and the credulity of thoſe who gave credit to it? In the two little conflicts which happened, has not a ſmall body of that enemy whoſe whole force they affected to deſpiſe and contemn, ſo ſeverely treated a body of troops ſent to diſlodge them, that they ſtaggered at leaſt, if they did not abſolutely retreat; and was it not found neceſſary to ſend them a ſtrong reinforcement leaſt they ſhould be cut off; and did they not ſuffer a great ſlaughter though they fought under the protecting fire of fleet and batteries? And had they not before been repulſed, ſlaughtered,

and obliged, by this very enemy, to ſeek protection under the cannon of Boſton? Is this the boaſted triumphal march of our troops over all America: and is this the enemy which the wiſdom of miniſtry, and their weak abettors, affected to deſpiſe? and where, after all that has been done, is contempt due, if, however, that contempt be not more properly exchanged for juſt indignation! How different is this beginning of our enterprize from that of Annibal at the battle of Carmes! Yet we were promiſed as much, nay much more from this army, for one half of it was to ſubdue all America; inſtead of which, its great merit has been to be able defend itſelf, though in a half-ſtarved condition, againſt the enemy it was to conquer; and this could only be effected by means of the ſtrongeſt fortifications that could be deviſed for its ſecurity. Having as yet made no conqueſt, and being debilitated both by action and inaction, conſequently no province, city, or town has declared itſelf in our favour, as a part of the Roman empire did for that general: on the contrary, the forts of Chamblée and St. John's in Canada have ſurrendered to, and are taken poſſeſſion of by a party of the enemy's troops which has been ſent againſt thoſe places; and it is doubtful whether Quebec be not in their actual poſſeſſion at this time; and if ſo, they have made themſelves maſters of all

Canada,

Canada, the conqueſt of which coſt us, according to * Lord Cheſterfield's account, no leſs than fourſcore millions ſterling. Had the enterprize of Annibal in his firſt operations been attended with inauſpicious diſadvantages like theſe, however great his ſkill, courage, and abilities might be, I am inclined to think he would have retreated in deſpair to have prevented his ruin. We have no general who claims the military abilities of Annibal, and if there were, he would not have an army like that of Annibal to command. Is it for theſe reaſons that the wiſdom of miniſtry orders this ſhattered army to remain where it is? But they are to be reinforced. True. But can you ſend to America an army of ſeventy or eighty thouſand men complete for the field? Perhaps an army ſomewhat leſs than this might protract the war, and thereby become beneficial to miniſtry and their friends; but it is doubtful whether ſuch an army would be able to conquer America. If it could, much time would be required to effect it; and much bloodſhed on both ſides would diſgrace the conqueſt. But whether it could, or not, certain it is miniſtry cannot ſend it. To talk of any reinforcement they can ſend as effectual to this purpoſe, is as frivolous now, as it was futile before to make an oſten-

* Lord Cheſterfield's Letter, 328.

tatious parade of what that army would do which was ſent. How that army ſucceeded we all know, for we all know it did not ſucceed: and we ſhall know when reinforcements are ſent, that they will ſucceed no better. Theſe expedients may perhaps ſerve to delude the vulgar, but thoſe who can ſee, and reaſon, will not ſuffer themſelves to be made the dupes of ſo ſhallow an artifice. The ſame wiſdom which dictated the war, and the ſame counſels which directed former meaſures, will preſide over the future. Their effects are but too well known and felt, and the Americans would be unreaſonable indeed to wiſh for any circumſtance more favourable to their cauſe; and we, to expect ſucceſs under the auſpices of ſuch an adminiſtration. If the enterpriſe of Annibal proved fatal to his country, though undertaken and proſecuted under ſo many apparent advantages not one of which attends ours againſt America, why may not our perſiſting therein render it as fatal to us, as that was to Carthage? It is with nations as with individuals, ill-judged ſecurity and unfeigned contempt, are too often the means and prognoſtics of ruin. We have no idea that the Americans can conquer; and I have no opinion of the poſſibility of our conquering them; if we do, I am perſuaded it muſt be effected by their fault, rather than be the conſequence of our councils, or any army

army we can ſend againſt them. True it is, we may keep up a long and tedious war; and this is all we can do, and, I preſume, all that adminiſtration are now doing, or indeed mean to do. How the people will reliſh ſo burthenſome an expenſe, future time will declare; for a war ſo carried on will neceſſarily reduce us to the condition the poet ſpeaks of, which is truly pitiable even when attended with victory, *Propriuſque fuêre periclo quibus ſuperate datum.* Succeſs upon theſe terms would almoſt bring us to ruin.

This American war cannot be ſupported without very extraordinary ſupplies. Monies muſt be levied, and new additional taxes impoſed on the ſubject, not only to ſupport the war, but to make good the deficiencies of duties and cuſtoms of American commerce which is now at an end. How adminiſtration can ſuppoſe we ſhould cheerfully ſubmit to ſuch burthens, and in ſuch a cauſe, is to me inconceiveable, if they conſider the Public in any better light than as ſo many beaſts devoted to bear whatever weight their caprice ſhall be pleaſed to load them withal. Since the laſt war, though a profound peace has ſubſiſted, uninterrupted by expenſive ſquabbles either in Europe or America, yet the public has received little or no relief in the article of taxation; taxes have been continued almoſt in the ſame

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ſtate, as though we had been conſtantly carrying on a vigorous war. Theſe taxes were heavy, burthenſome, and grievous, and the people had a right to expect alleviation and redreſs in ſo important a matter, and in proportion to the oppreſſion. But inſtead of redreſs, theſe burthens are now to be redoubled, by this new device of plunging us into an American war.

War, with any ſtate, and eventual as it may be, will ever promote the deſigns of a ſelf-intereſted miniſtry. It is a political maxim adopted in moſt countries, when a people are diſſatisfied with miniſtry, for miniſtry to divert, if poſſible, that attention from themſelves, by introducing ſome other object, and this object is generally war. Thus ſecurity reſults to miniſtry from the averted attention of the public from them, to war, as ſailors derive ſafety from throwing out a barrel to amuſe the whale. The people have no confidence in miniſtry; and miniſtry are conſcious of it. They hold their office by a precarious tenure, and hope ſo long as they amuſe the public, that they may remain unnoticed; but if that public has leiſure to reflect, they expect to be removed; becauſe the grounds of their complaints are juſt and reaſonable. War being therefore for the preſent advantage of a miniſtry ſo ſituated, and in truth any war in preference to no war, we cannot be ſurprized

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to ſee them engage in it with keeneſs and avidity, or promote its continuance with a ſettled and determined reſolution, preferably to any other mode of proceeding with the Americans, even though they were conſcious of the certain inſufficiency of any force they can ſend againſt them for the purpoſe of conqueſt. There are beſides, other contingencies which make war a miniſterial harveſt; their relations, friends, and numerous dependents, which my Lord Bolingbroke ſomewhere emphatically ſtiles the *lumber of a miniſtry, and the furniture of a court*, are by this mean provided for, and liberally ſupported at the public expence: in proportion as the property of the ſubject is thus legally plundered to the injury of the whole community, theſe individuals are filling their boſoms with the ſheaves which were cultivated at the charge of others by the careful hands of induſtry. But it imports not whence this accumulation is made; nor who are the ſufferers; to ſuch a ſtate of diſtreſs are we now reduced, that miniſtry make their demands upon us, and however exorbitant, the public is under the neceſſity of complying with them. It is in vain to look for juſtice or moderation from the hands of miniſtry; they have purchaſed their power and influence, and muſt be refunded their purchaſe money with a large ſurplus, and this can only come from the body of the

people. So long therefore as we decline the vindication of our rights, and the ſecuring of our property from becoming the prey of miniſtry, ſo long will miniſtry, which is daily increaſing in power and approaching to political omnipotence, proceed to load us with their enormous burthens; till at laſt we muſt ſink under their rigour, and the load of deſpotiſm they will heap upon us. If a very ſmall ſhare of that ſedulous art and artifice, diſguiſe and ſeduction, avarice and ambition, intrigue and political manœuvres, which have been ſo uniformly maintained, ſupported and practiſed both at Court and in Cabinet, had been converted into a firm unſhaken regard for the public weal, this American war had not now been the topic of converſation, or the cauſe of impoveriſhing this Nation; and perſuaded I am, that miniſtry in ſuch caſe would as ſoon have thought of inviting an army of forty thouſand French into the heart of this Kingdom, as to have ſent thirty thouſand troops to America to make war on its inhabitants.

But war is advantageous to a miniſtry; the ſword therefore is drawn: and true it is, that a madman can draw a ſword, which a wiſe man may not be able, when he would, to replace in the ſcabbard. War is now gone forth, as a tempeſt howling over the peaceful deep, to throw every thing into con-

confuſion, and to deal deſtruction on every ſide. Who ſhall ſet bounds to the devaſtation, limit its duration, and reſtore peace! Innumerable obſtructions will every day ariſe to prevent it; the advantages either party may have gained in the warfare, the confidence each will entertain of its ſuperior ſtrength, the habit the people will have contracted for war, and their diſinclination to follow any other employment for a maintenance, the enmity and averſion each party may entertain for the other from repeated violence and injuries reciprocally given and received, with a thouſand other cauſes likely to ſtart forth, will make a reconciliation, however neceſſary or deſireable, become extremely difficult, if at all practicable, 'till conqueſt be determined either on the one ſide or on the other. So dreadful are then theſe ſolemn appeals to Heaven! Miniſtry have made the appeal: I hope they have confidence in the juſtice of their cauſe: I proteſt I have none. But with millions, I may ſay, in this kingdom, am utterly averſe to the meaſure, and waſh my hands of all the guilt of each drop of the innocent blood that already has been, or in future ſhall be ſpilt on this melancholy occaſion.

Since this American conteſt has been in agitation, a notion has prevailed both in public and private, that the landed intereſt of Great Britain are the abettors of miniſtry

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in this American war. I am perſuaded, whatever grounds there might be for ſuch an aſſertion, that it cannot be, generally ſpeaking, true: for certain it is, if their humanity did not lead them to be averſe to this war, their intereſt however ought to have made them deteſt it. But as the landholders make ſo important a part of the body of the people of Great Britain, it is neceſſary to remove the prepoſſeſſions of ſome, and to inform the judgment of others by giving this ſubject a ſhort diſcuſſion. In the preſent caſe, it is neceſſary to divide the landholders into two claſſes. The one includes the landholders who have ſome profeſſion, buſineſs, employment, or any other mean, from which they derive a revenue or income abſtractedly from that of their lands. The other claſs includes thoſe landholders whoſe ſole revenue is the rents and profits of their lands, without having ſeparate and diſtinct incomes like the former. Now I would not be ſuppoſed to deny that there are many of the landholders of this firſt claſs who join the miniſtry. Miniſtry have ſo many lucrative appointments to diſpoſe of in every profeſſion and in every department of life men can be engaged in, together with ſo many ſinecures, and douceurs for every emergency, that it is not reaſonable in our time to imagine that thoſe who poſſeſs them ſhould not become as in-

different

different to the calamities of this war, as they are to the burthen this war will bring upon their landed property, as ſuch appointments exceed oftentimes the whole value of their rents; and in any caſe muſt conſiderably overbalance any taxation their lands are likely to be ſubjected to on that account.— As theſe emoluments from miniſtry, are not diſpoſed of on terms which leave to the poſſeſſors the freedom of acting, there is little room to expect they would relinquiſh ſuch advantages, and the ſide of miniſtry, for the bare liberty of acting on their own principles. Theſe, therefore, may in general be ſuppoſed to unite with miniſtry; together with all ſuch as are expectants, either in behalf of themſelves or others, and this may extend to very remote connections.— But for thoſe of the ſecond claſs, the landholders conſidered merely as ſuch, I do apprehend both from what I ſee, and from the nature of the caſe, that they do not, in this ſtep at leaſt, unite with miniſtry; and certainly, nothing can be more diametrically oppoſite to their intereſt, than for them ſo to do. I believe however that ſome artifice hath been practiſed by miniſtry and their emiſſaries to allure them. The *ignis fatuus* which was ſent forth to bewilder their ſenſes, to weary them by a reſtleſs toil in a vain and imaginary purſuit, and at laſt to plunge them into inextricable difficulties,

was

was nothing leſs than a pretended alleviation of the land-tax. Miniſtry well know where hardſhips are placed; I would too that they were as ſedulous to remove them. They generally know likewiſe the means of leading a multitude by imperceptible gradations, to defeat their own ends, and to work their own evil; but in this inſtance their ſubtlety failed them. For we muſt not conclude, that if their repreſentatives have joined the miniſtry, and have ſupported their meaſures, that in ſo doing they have acted conformably to the ſentiments of their conſtituents, or that their conſtituents do adopt their ſentiments. No, the caſe is far otherwiſe; and they acted not upon the ſame plan, becauſe perhaps they had different motives and inducements. Be this as it may, to induce the landed intereſt to promote the meaſures of miniſtry, it was ſuggeſted to them,— If you complain of the burthen of the land-tax, you have now before you the means of redreſs; you muſt vigorouſly ſupport miniſtry in oppoſition to America; a revenue is to be raiſed from thence, and you will find relief; it is true, the Americans will not approve of the meaſure, and they may remonſtrate againſt it, but it will be to no purpoſe; and as to reſiſtance, that will either be impracticable, or if attempted as ſoon defeated; and thus without further inconvenience or expence, you may aſſure yourſelves

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of redreſs; all that is required of you is to be ſtrenuous on the part of miniſtry, and you may then conſider the end as accompliſhed.

In terms like theſe were hopes given to the land-holders, who at firſt erected their creſts, which had hitherto been depreſſed by the weight of taxes. But as ſoon as they came ſeriouſly to reflect on the nature of the cauſe they were to eſpouſe, its impropriety, and the probable effects that would reſult from it, very few, if any, of thoſe who could properly be ſtiled independent, gave it the leaſt countenance; and ſo far from ſupporting, abjured the meaſure. They could not but know and foreſee, that the cauſe was deſperate, to ſay no more of it, and in the end would be ruinous to them. This I know was declared at the time, long before violence had been perpetrated, or an army had been ſent to America to enforce obedience; but the emiſſaries and adherents of miniſtry affected to treat the notion with contempt, and as a mere emanation of the ignorance of its authors. How juſtly it was founded, the event and dear experience do now confirm, whilſt miniſtry are getting together all the troops they can collect from every quarter, both domeſtic and foreign, to tranſport them to America; and this laſt ſeſſion of Parliament has without any the

leaſt

leaſt heſitation laid on them an additional ſhilling in the pound land-tax for a beginning, as an aid towards proſecuting this American war. And I think they may remain very well aſſured, be the war of ever ſo ſhort duration, ſucceſsful or unſucceſsful, they will never (without ſome greater effort than can be reaſonably expected from the ſupineneſs of land-holders) ſee that ſhilling taken off again. So that from Lady-day, 1776, a land-tax of four ſhillings in the pound, at leaſt, will be entailed upon them and their generations after them for ever. This is one of the bleſſings the land-holders are to derive from this American war, be its duration ever ſo ſhort: but ſhould it peradventure be of any continuance, I am perſuaded ſo inattentive and inactive are they in whatever concerns their intereſt, and the taxation of their property, that even ſix ſhillings in the pound will hardly excuſe them in future. And though I found this opinion on ſomewhat more than mere conjecture, I know the force of their incredulity, and expect in return for the caution here given that they will reprehend me, and rank me among the number of the dreamers of dreams. But whether I dream or not, confident I am that either they are not awake, or might as well have been aſleep as far as concerns an intereſt important to them, and which they

they ſeem now to neglect with the ſame indifference they have done for ſome years paſt, and with the careleſſneſs of a worthleſs parent have totally abandoned to the will of unrelenting miniſtry. If they mean therefore to continue in this lethargic ſtate, cankered and incruſted with ſupineneſs inſtead of taking an active and determined part in ſupport and vindication of their property, they muſt not complain or regret if they become the inſignificant dupes of a miniſtry; their property the legal ſpoil of a corrupted few; or if they have ſix ſhillings in the pound laid on their lands and houſes to be waſted and conſumed, or pretended to be ſo, in an American war, from which I do not ſee it poſſible for them to derive one ſingle benefit.

What the emiſſaries of miniſtry gave out, That the landholders might obtain an alleviation of their land tax, and without expence, is falſe in the firſt inſtance; for the alleviation propoſed has not happened, nor is it ever likely to happen; and the expence which was never to happen, is already arrived. Unleſs they conſider the additional ſhilling in the pound already laid on as no expence to the land-holder. From that eaſe and facility with which it was propoſed; that it was no ſooner propoſed than conſented to; and that without heſitation it was the firſt tax upon this occaſion thought of and concluded upon, are convincing

proofs

proofs of the light eſtimation in which this tax is conſidered, and that the land-holders are held out by miniſtry in all caſes as their devoted victims. Where will this end; and what in the courſe of time will be the conſequence of ſuch opinions accompanied with ſuch adulatory compliance? Who can foreſee where miniſtry will vouchſafe to draw the line, and in mercy to the land-holder ſay, Thus far, is enough!

The propoſition then is falſe in one inſtance; the expence: for one ſhilling in the pound land tax is now laid on. Let us next conſider the probability of that other part; an alleviation in the land tax. And indeed, if the land-holders concurred in promoting this war, it could be with no other view than to find a relief from America in the land-tax. And as this tax has been laid on at different times by a ſhilling in the pound, (as ſome ſcruple not to affirm principally in the ſupport and defence of America) they might therefore have reaſon to expect it would be taken off in like manner, by a relief afforded them from American taxation. This concluſion is natural; but if ſuch was their expectation, (and I do not ſee they could have any other) they would be no leſs deceived in this ſecond inſtance, than they were in the firſt. In a word, miniſtry had no ſuch object in contemplation, nor indeed could they poſſibly have

have attained it; this notion was given out to amuſe, while miniſtry meant nothing more than to fight their own battles at the landholder's expence. For ſuppoſe, if you will, the Americans ſubdued, and brought to miniſterial terms: What annual ſum or revenue do miniſtry expect to raiſe on them? —I never heard a larger propoſed than 300,000*l.* Let us ſuppoſe for a moment the whole of this ſum could be raiſed; and every ſhilling of it applied to eaſe the land-tax, which, by the way, is a circumſtance altogether improbable, or rather impoſſible and impracticable; however, in favour of the landed intereſt, let us a while ſuppoſe it. How much even in this moſt flattering inſtance would the land-holders be thereby relieved in their land-tax? I anſwer, not ſeven-pence farthing in the pound. One ſhilling in the pound land-tax raiſes 500,000*l.* according to which proportion 300,000*l.* is not ſo much as ſeven-pence farthing in the pound. If the land-holders therefore do concur in promoting this American war in expectation of relief, the leaſt that can be ſaid of them is, that they have ruſhed too precipitantly into the meaſure; how inconſiderately, the leaſt reflection will determine. The firſt advance they make coſts them one ſhilling in the pound additional land-tax; and how much more it may be attended with in future, I am certain they

will not pretend to determine for themſelves. If neither a reconciliation, nor a rejection takes place, and ſhortly too, it is very probable they will feel the weight of two ſhillings more in the pound, that is, they will pay ſix ſhillings in the pound land-tax before the concluſion of this war. So that by their miſmanagement and imprudence, and precipitation, they have been inſtrumental in bringing upon themſelves a certain conſiderable expence, together with the proſpect of a much greater, for the bare *hopes* of acquiring a ſmall, trifling and uncertain gain.— The expected gain itſelf is chimerical, improbable, and, I may ſay, impoſſible and unattainable; and were it not ſo, is altogether diſproportionable and inadequate to the certain loſs incurred by the attempt to acquire it.

Could the land-holders be deluded to ſo great a degree as to imagine that on a ſuppoſition 300,000*l.* could be annually raiſed from America, that the whole of this ſum would be appropriated by miniſtry to give them relief in the land-tax! They muſt conceit themſelves the great favourites of miniſtry indeed, to ſuggeſt that a war like this is undertaken ſolely on their account. That the ſecurity and proſperity of King and kingdom are both hazarded to give them the pitiful relief of ſeven-pence farthing in the pound land-tax. That no part of the re-

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venue raiſed in America ſhall be expended in benefit to that country on which it was raiſed. And laſtly, they muſt entertain a ſtrange opinion of miniſtry, through whoſe hands it is to paſs, to ſurmiſe that it will be held ſo ſacred that no part of it will be purloined from public uſe. Upon the whole then, ſuppoſe 300,000 *l.* to be raiſed; part of it judiciouſly appropriated, and part of it crumbled away, as uſual, in the handling; I will venture to aſſert, what I believe no man will deny, that the remaining part, were it applied to mitigate the land-tax, would not afford the landed intereſt the poor relief of two-pence in the pound.

The land-holder moreover might know (from dear experience he has reaſon to know it) with what difficulty any the leaſt alleviation is obtained in the land-tax; with what reluctance miniſtry ſuffer the leaſt part of a land-tax to be remitted when once laid on; and that it is a tax increaſing upon him to his beggary and ruin. Whoever reflects ſeriouſly on this, muſt be aſtoniſhed to ſee him thruſting himſelf forward in this American contention, and imprecating taxes, as a thoughtleſs abandoned wretch doth curſes, on himſelf and his poſterity.

Whatever ſet of men in this kingdom may be benefited by war, it is indiſputably the intereſt of the land-holders to promote peace. War doth ever burthen them with taxes,

without affording any ſubſtitute, or making them any compenſation whatever. But a war like this with America is pregnant with ruin to all orders of men in the community, miniſtry and their dependants only excepted; who by this mean expect to have the plundering of both parties, and conſequently have nothing leſs in contemplation than to enrich themſelves by the ſpoil. Excelling in this reſpect the magiſtrates even of Rome, by whom *avarice and private rapine were at laſt added to political ambition. The Provinces were firſt oppreſſed and plundered. The calamity in proceſs of time, reached Italy itſelf, and the centre of the Republic**. Thus theſe Magiſtrates went deliberately and gradually to work to feed their ambition and avarice; the Provinces firſt fell a ſacrifice, then Italy, and laſtly Rome itſelf; but miniſtry with us are not quite ſo indulgent; by one *coup de main* they attempt to execute their enterprize, and to involve Great Britain and America in the ſame calamity. In more inſtances than one† they ſeem to act on the principles of Cardinal Mazarin, of whom Lord Cheſ-

* De Lolme's Conſtitution of England, p. 342.

† "Mazarin trod in the ſteps of Richlieu; he met "with great oppoſition, but ſucceeded in the end. He "moreover ſtripped the Parliament of its prerogatives; "inſomuch that that Aſſembly is now but a ſhadow, which

Cheſterfield in his 177th letter ſays, *I mean Ambition and Avarice: the latter is often the true cauſe of the former; and then is the predominant paſſion. It ſeems to have been ſo in Cardinal Mazarin; who did any thing, ſubmitted to any thing, and forgave any thing for the ſake of plunder. He loved and courted Power like an uſurer; becauſe it carried Profit along with it.*

But the independent landholders, of all men exiſting, can have no proſpect of advantage either direct or indirect, preſent or remote, in proſecuting this war: and therefore I cannot be induced to believe they ever promoted it. For if we do not ſubdue America, what a fruitleſs waſte of their property! And if we ſuppoſe it ſubdued, what benefit can accrue to them, or any others, by the poſſeſſion of a country laid waſte;

" which ſtill, at times, will fancy itſelf to be a body, " but it is generally made to repent of its error." Le Cardinal Mazarin marcha fur les traces de Richelieu: il eſſuia beaucoup d'oppoſitions; mais il y réuſſit. Il dépouilla de plus le Parlement des ſes prérogatives; de ſorte que cette Compagnie n'eſt aujourd'hui qu'un fantôme, á qui il arrive encore quelque fois de s'imaginer qu'il pourroit bien étre un Corps, mais qu'on ſaire ordinairement repentir de cette erreur. *Anti-Mach.* ch. 3, p. 35.

And Lord Cheſterfield ſays, " Richlieu came and ſhackled the nation, and Mazarin and Louis 14th rivetted the ſhackles." Letter 234.

its people deſtroyed; and its towns in aſhes? If the inhabitants are not all to be cut off, both they and their deſcendants will ever remain impatient under the yoke which is intended by this war to be put upon them. Lord Bolingbroke ſpeaks pertinently to the preſent caſe: *The freedom of a conſtitution reſts on two points. The orders of it are one: ſo* Machiavel *calls them, and I know not how to call them more ſignificantly. He means not only the forms and cuſtoms, but the different claſſes and aſſemblies of men, with different powers and privileges attributed to them, which are eſtabliſhed in the ſtate. The* ſpirit *and* character *of the* people *are the other. On the mutual conformity and harmony of theſe the preſervation of liberty depends. To take away, or eſſentially to alter the former, cannot be brought to paſs, whilſt the latter remains in original purity and vigour; nor can liberty be deſtroyed by this method, unleſs the attempt be made with a military force ſufficient to conquer the nation, which would not ſubmit in this caſe till it was conquered, nor with much ſecurity to the conqueror even then**. As this would in all probability be the caſe ſuppoſing America to be ſubjected, unleſs it be intended to extirpate the inhabitants, (which Heaven forbid!) therefore, to keep and continue them in ſub-

* Lord Bolingbroke's Patriot King, p. 120.

jection,

jection, garriſons muſt be formed throughout that extenſive empire, and that army ſupported at the expence of Great Britain; in which caſe, will not the land-holders be obliged to contribute their ſhare towards this new created expence? For as to America, after the devaſtation of war it would not be able to ſupport itſelf. And depopulated by two powerful cauſes, the one the ſword, the other the flight of its inhabitants into the back ſettlements, the mountains, remote and almoſt impervious and inacceſſible parts, what will remain of this once populous and flouriſhing colony? If it be to revive, and become once more a colony, it muſt for this purpoſe be nurſed anew, and this will employ the courſe of many years, and much treaſure muſt be expended before it will arrive at any tolerable degree of ſtrength and maturity. The treaſures neceſſary for this purpoſe muſt come from Great Britain; if from Great Britain, will the land-holders be overlooked when theſe ſubſidies are raiſed?

If I have dwelt longer than was propoſed on the impropriety of the land-holders promoting this war, it has been with a view to remove what I conceive to be a prejudice taken up againſt them, by ſetting forth the improbability of the fact from the obvious conſequences attending ſuch a meaſure, all which are evidently contrary to his intereſts

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in particular. Nor can I ſee that the nation in general can be benefited by this war, not even on the ſuppoſition that we become victorious. On the contrary, let us ſubdue, or be ſubdued, on either hand, which ever way we turn, if this war continues, there is nothing but diſtreſs marked out for us. We are reduced to that ſituation which makes the very hope of victory and conqueſt dreadful. Succeſs is to be lamented; and we may lament that there is no probability of ſucceſs. For this can be the reſult only, in our caſe, of the ſuperior wiſdom of our Councils over thoſe of the Americans, ſince in moſt other particulars of importance they have certainly the advantage over us. The *ſuperior wiſdom* of our councils is then to decide; and as this point is of ſo much conſequence, I ſhall be excuſed if inſtead of repoſing an implicit confidence in what is advanced by others* on this ſubject, I ſhould proceed to a conciſe inveſtigation from paſt events;

* Dean Tucker, in his Addreſs to the Landed Intereſt, p. 8, ſays, "For I think it may be fairly allowed, "without paying them (the preſent ſet of miniſters) any "compliment, that they are to the full as *able* and as *honeſt* "as the beſt of thoſe who endeavour to ſupplant them." This is a very courtly inſinuation, for it neither proves, nor even aſſerts any thing to the purpoſe: they may be as able and as honeſt as the beſt of thoſe who are endeavouring to ſupplant them, and yet, perhaps, have no claim either

events; which will tend more to eſtabliſh it on its proper footing, and to be deciſive of what we are to expect from it, than all the frothy and complimentary adulation of a thouſand tongues.

It is well known, for we are now feeling the effects of it, that the views and manœuvres of miniſtry had convinced all America at leaſt, that they were directly levelled againſt the liberties of that people; this raiſed the general diſcontent and indignation of the inhabitants throughout that continent. At length the minds of the people were not only univerſally inflamed, but their hands were ready to take up arms. Under the in-

either to honeſty, or ability in their profeſſion. This compliment is of that kind which defeats its own aim, and deſtroys that which it was intended to eſtabliſh. What the people require at this time, is to have men in the adminiſtration of public affairs, who are both able and honeſt in an eminent degree, let them come from what quarter they will. This, I ſay, is required at this time by the public, and the public do *require* it, becauſe, I preſume, they have a right to *demand* it. And that ſuch men are to be found, no one can doubt, if faction, party, and favouritiſm, the bane of civil government, were ſet aſide. A King of England may at all times have an able and honeſt miniſtry in ſpite of any oppoſition or faction; and the People who would derive proſperity from ſuch an adminiſtration, would chearfully ſupport them in office, when once appointed. But the People cannot appoint, though they may ſupport: and therefore, if they are not appointed for them, they can never have them.

fluence

fluence of this notion, juſt, or unjuſt, (which ſhall be further diſcuſſed in the ſequel) we are not be ſurpriſed at the effect as containing any thing the leaſt extraordinary; all men may know it is too late to contend for liberty, when the ſhackles are once rivetted on; and a ſenſible political author delivers it as a precept, that "It is both juſt and merciful "to take up arms in defence of liberty, "when all other means, hopes, and re-"ſources fail;" *Qui è giuſtitia grande, perche quella guerra è giuſta che gli è neceſſaria, e quelle armi ſono pietoſe dove non ſi ſpera in altro, che in elle.** Here we muſt pauſe to obſerve where the wiſdom of miniſtry exerted itſelf. Was it wiſdom to raiſe ſuch a ferment? when unhappily raiſed, where was the wiſdom in not finding ſome expedient to allay it? Or was it the better wiſdom to ſuffer it to take its courſe, and to acquire that ſtrength in which we now behold it?

At this time, miniſtry were not ignorant of the ſtate of America, for the common news-papers furniſhed us all with that knowledge: yet ſuch was their wiſdom, that they ſuffered themſelves to be amuſed with an idle tale, nay to give implicit faith to it, though there was not a man of under-

* Machiavelli. cap. 26.

ſtanding

ſtanding and experience in the kingdom who could ſwallow ſo palpable an abſurdity, That an army of five thouſand regulars would march unimpeded from one end of America to the other, and ſubject that whole continent without difficulty, to the will of miniſtry. They were led to believe that with ſuch a force all was to be completed in Cæſar's gallant and expeditious manner, *Veni, vidi, vici.* Theſe forces were accordingly ſent; which, not attempting to land in any hoſtile manner, were permitted to come on ſhore, without obſtruction. Had force been uſed, ſo far from kicking all America before them, it is probable not one man would have marched an hundred paces upon that continent. A ſimulated pacific diſpoſition, accompanied with a reſtraint from hoſtilities having ſecured their landing; they were received into Boſton with lukewarmneſs. Their general no ſooner turned himſelf round, than he evidently perceived miniſtry had been made the dupes of their own creatures. He applied for a reinforcement; not to act offenſively, for that he ſaw was impoſſible; but leaſt matters ſhould become more deſperate, he might be able to act defenſively: not to puſh on the war againſt the Americans with ſuch a force, and with which he might as rationally have attempted to puſh America into Europe; but by this conjoined force to be able to find

find ſafety within the fortifications of Boſton which he was now erecting in the ſtrongeſt manner. He applied for a reinforcement; it was ſent him: and his army being increaſed to almoſt treble the number at firſt propoſed, inſtead of acting offenſively, was employed in fortifying Boſton by every means art could deviſe, leſt they ſhould be there attacked, and cut off to a man by a ſmall part only of the whole of the American forces.

Thus was this army, (one half part only of which miniſtry were impoſed on to believe would conquer all America by the terrors of its appearance) I ſay even this whole army was cooped up, hardly daring to look beyond the *pomocrium* of Boſton for the greater part of the ſummer; living upon a ſcanty allowance of ſalt proviſions; diſtreſſed by ſickneſs from their confinement and diet, which increaſing, ſwept them off like a peſtilential diſeaſe, and they dropt as faſt as leaves from the trees in the latter part of autumn: and within thoſe fortifications they would probably have remained to this hour, had not immediate ſelf-preſervation rendered it neceſſary for them to diſlodge a party of the American troops which had taken poſſeſſion of Bunker's Hill, and were abſolutely preparing to bombard the town. Thus ended this glorious campaign, which was planned by the wiſdom of miniſtry, in the acqui-

acquiſition of about one acre and a half of ground gained at the expence of twelve hundred men, who were either killed on the ſpot, or whoſe maims have rendered them unfit for further ſervice; with the loſs of about two thouſand more who have periſhed by diſeaſe in Boſton, or by accidents of various kinds in going to it; or have been worſe than loſt, by deſertion to the enemy; whoſe example, if I am rightly informed, would have been followed by very great numbers, had not their ſituation made it too difficult, and had they not been as carefully watched as the Americans themſelves.

A well-concerted plan, activity, and a formidable ſtroke given in the commencement of a war are generally the prelude of victory and conqueſt. Wiſdom dictates the meaſure, and leaves the execution and event to ſkill, fortitude, and courage; but this opportunity once neglected is loſt for ever. Miniſtry had this opportunity in their power, but it is now no more. America no doubt was vulnerable, but I think ſhe is ſo no longer. It was the part of the wiſdom of miniſtry to have penetrated this ſecret before hoſtile meaſures were concluded upon; and not firſt to determine upon hoſtile meaſures, and then to be at a loſs for the means of executing them. Yet this is that wiſdom which has been ſo much applauded in late addreſſes, and it is this wiſdom which has brought the

army

army at Boſton into almoſt incredible difficulties, to ſay no worſe; and this wiſdom muſt in the end, if perſiſted in, bring this nation much ſooner to ruin, than America into ſubjection. Upon the very face of things this wiſdom committed two capital, dangerous, and unpardonable errors. The firſt was, to be ſo ignorant of the ſtate of America with reſpect to the temper, reſentment, courage, and unanimity of the inhabitants and of the armed troops that could on an emergency be raiſed on that continent to oppoſe the meaſures of miniſtry. Had theſe circumſtances been known in any tolerable degree, one would imagine frenzy itſelf would not have ſent that army to Boſton, which, before it had ſurrounded itſelf with fortifications, was more indebted for its ſafety to the clemency of the Americans, or at leaſt a reluctance in them to proceed to extremities, than to any judicious deſtination allotted to it by miniſtry. An averſion in the Americans to ſhed the blood of their innocent fellow ſubjects till urged and prompted thereto by ſelf-preſervation and abſolute neceſſity was at that hour the only ſecurity of that army; for had the Americans been bent on deſtruction, had they been by nature ſanguinary and ſavage as they have been falſely repreſented, they might with eaſe have led to Boſton before the fortifications had been erected, ſuch a

part

part of their troops as would have ſacrificed every man in that army to the wiſdom of the miniſtry which had ſent them. This was the firſt error; and the ſecond was like unto it; unpardonable, becauſe it was erring contrary to known rules, maxims, and precepts. I mean, the error of ſending an army into a country where not only the diſpoſition of the inhabitants were not favourable to it, but even where the treatment of miniſtry had rendered the people inimical and hoſtile; and what is more, without having one neighbouring province to countinance, to aſſiſt, and to ſupport them: in a word, without a ſingle province on that whole continent having declared in their favour. Were theſe men inclined to improve by experience, the affair at St. Cas in the laſt war, might have taught them the folly and weakneſs of ſuch expeditions, which can ſerve no other purpoſe than to ſacrifice the unhappy troops who are ſent upon them. And the late ſlaughter of the Spaniſh troops on the coaſt of Barbary, affords another recent proof of the futility of theſe adventures. Or could precept avail, it is laid down in expreſs terms by Machiaval, that, " However powerful your army may " be, it is neceſſary to obtain the favour of " the inhabitants before you march into " their country; *Perche ſempre ancora che uno ſia forteſſimo in ſù gli eſſercitti, ha biſogna*

ancora

ancora del favore de' Provinciali ad entrar in una provincia *. The precept is juſt; the reaſons are obvious to every man of the leaſt reflection; the preceding miſcarriages, with many more were we to look further back into paſt occurences, juſtify it: and becauſe miniſtry were unacquainted with, forgot, or contemned both the examples and precept, our army has experienced at leaſt ſome, though (thanks be to the humanity of the Americans!) not all the inconveniencies, or rather calamities ariſing from this neglect or contempt, both with reſpect to their enemies without, and the fatal ſickneſs and almoſt abſolute famine they ſuffered within the walls of Boſton. And much more fatal had been this expedition, if the Americans had brought down a part of their forces, and had attacked our troops immediately upon their landing. Nor can it be imputed to the wiſdom of miniſtry, but to a reluctance in the Americans to imbrue their hands in blood, that this was not effected.

Where then are we to look for this applauded wiſdom of miniſtry? Has it manifeſted itſelf by a knowledge of that part of America which was vulnerable? and therefore an army was ſent to Boſton where it could not act; to be ruined by

* Machiavelli, cap. 3.

ſickneſs

ſickneſs and deſertion; or to be cut in pieces by the Americans, if they ventured beyond the protection of the fleet, and their fortifications.—Has it conſiſted in a knowledge of the ſtrength of the Provincials, who have an army of ſeventy or eighty thouſand men well diſciplined, and who could raiſe on an emergency double that number? and therefore an army of twelve thouſand men only have been ſent againſt them, and that at different periods?—Has it diſplayed itſelf in the knowledge of the military proweſs of this people? or was that left to be decided at Lexington and Bunker's-Hill?—Has it extended only ſo far as to know what genius the Americans poſſeſſed for war, or to form an idea of their power and abilities? or was that left to be determined when a ſmall part only of their forces ſhould block up an army in Boſton, one half of which it was imagined would ſubdue all America?—Or doth it conſiſt in the knowledge of the force of American reſentment, as deſcendants of Britons, when founded on principles of honour and juſtice, for ſuppoſed contempt, inſults, and injuries received? of which they have at length given ſome evident and ſatisfactory proof.—Or laſtly, has it diſtinguiſhed itſelf in ſending an army to Boſton not only previous to a declaration of the inhabitants in its favour, but without having friends in the province whither it was ſent; without

having ſecured a contiguous province in its favour; or indeed any one province upon that continent? by means whereof that army has been hemmed in, and in a manner deſtroyed by ſickneſs and famine; in perpetual danger from the enemy; and inactive in every thing beyond ſelf-preſervation. If theſe be the characteriſtics of wiſdom, it can be only of that kind which muſt undo us. In all miniſtry have done, I profeſs to diſcover nothing ſuperior to a long train of glaring and enormous inconſiſtencies, ſuch as would degrade common ſenſe to adopt them; and to endeavour to give them the colouring of good policy or wiſdom, would be offering a mockery and violence to the underſtandings of mankind. Every man muſt ſee, that throughout this whole undertaking they have been weak, wavering, fickle, uncertain, indeterminate; limping between reſolution and timidity, temerity and deſpondency, perſeverance and deſpair, juſtice and injuſtice, emolument and conſcience; one while fluctuating on this ſide, then on the other, touching at times each of the extremes, and fixing no where. Thus has this war from want of knowledge, or by deſign been protracted, by which, a burthen of taxes and other misfortunes are come upon us, and more are ruſhing on apace. At length, as a man ſuddenly rouſed from his ſleep, ſtarts up, and before he is well awake,

catches

catches faſt hold on whatever is near him, he knows not what; ſo miniſtry determine on a plan the moſt improper for them to conduct, if we may be allowed to judge from the abilities they have hitherto diſplayed. And we are now to go blundering on through this American buſineſs ſword in hand,

Omne ſacrum rapiente dextra.

And it may be preſumed they are no better acquainted with the face of that country into which their armies are now to march, than they were before with the genius and diſpoſition of the Americans. On all ſides every thing is hoſtile, and they will have to encounter with troops at leaſt equal to themſelves in point of courage and diſcipline, unleſs it can be ſuppoſed that an army conſiſting indeed of ſome few good Britiſh troops, the reſt raw undiſciplined levies, German troops, and ragamuffin German vagrants, the dregs of a wretched country, picked up in every quarter of it, and enliſting for a ſubſiſtence, are ſuperior to an army of Britiſh deſcendants contending in the cauſe of liberty and whatever beſide is dear to mankind. From a patched up motly army like this, what is to be expected? Will any man be ſurpriſed, if on the firſt opportunity after their landing, one half of theſe mercenaries ſhould deſert to the enemy, when our own troops, from an

averſion, I ſuppoſe, to the cauſe, have already ſet them the example; and when this may be effected with more facility in marching into a country, than when confined by narrow fortifications where nothing almoſt can paſs unnoticed. There are many cauſes to induce theſe mercenary troops to deſert, and what if the Americans ſhould declare that wherever they met them in arms they would give them no quarter, as having no right to be there becauſe they cannot be intereſted in the diſpute; that they come there as robbers and murtherers, and ought to be conſidered and treated as ſuch: but on the contrary, if they will join them againſt their opponents they will give them ſuitable encouragement; or if they will decline the profeſſion of war, and come over, they ſhall be provided with a retirement in their back ſettlements. I ſay, it can hardly be ſuppoſed when ſuch offers are made, and no doubt they will be made, that theſe foreigners ſhould reject them. Moſt men would prefer agriculture, and the employments attending a rural life, with peace and ſafety, if they could ſupport themſelves in that way of life, to warfare, attended by conſtant hardſhips, perpetual inſecurity, and frequently death itſelf. And when they know that the American army is far ſuperior in number, and at leaſt as determined as their own, and that of courſe each individual

dividual of them will be more frequently called upon duty, and conſequently the oftener expoſed to danger, a conſideration which will ever weigh with mercenary troops, it would be extraordinary indeed, if by deſertion they did not provide for their own ſafety.

As to numbers, the American army will be greatly ſuperior to ours. And Lord Cheſterfield, though no general, yet may be ſuppoſed to have been able to form a tolerable judgment of the matter from hiſtory, reaſon, and experience; he ſays, * *In war, numbers are generally my omens.* And it is well known a great ‡ French general was ſo confident in this opinion, that it carried him even to an exceſs of impiety; if he had but the advantage of numbers, he defied every thing. Certain it is, that an army inferior in number, is not an army proper for offence; it may ſupport itſelf for ſome time on the defenſive from the favourable ſituation of the country in which it is to act, or from ſome accidental advantages; and if at the cloſe of the campaign it is not made to retreat from the country it was ſent to defend

* Letter, 316th.

‡ He was ſo confident of this advantage, that he is reported to have ſaid "Give me but the numbers, and G—— may take which ſide he will."

and cover, it may be ſaid to have effected all that could be reaſonably expected from it. But our army, though inferior in number is ſent to take poſſeſſion, to conquer, to ſubdue. In order to do this they muſt march forward, in a country where every thing around is hoſtile. They have further to contend with a people who have hearts to conceive, heads to contrive, and hands to execute, equal to any ſet of men, the buſineſs they have undertaken. If our army ſhould be once or twice defeated, (and defeated it may be, I ſee no reaſon why it ſhould not,) what is to become of the ſcattered remnant? what refuge? what retreat? There are no fortified towns to receive, or cover them. A communication with the fleet, if they are to march inland, will be cut off, and its protection intercepted. In ſuch caſe, will not the foreign troops, if they have not before deſerted, join the enemy in preference to being made priſoners of war and put under confinement, or to being cut to pieces? And if our army is not to march inland, how is it to conquer? for roaming about on the coaſt of America under protection of the fleet will never ſubdue America; it may protract the war, but will never bring it to a concluſion.

What if our army formed of mixed troops ſhould diſagree among themſelves, a circumſtance by no means improbable; and the

Britiſh

Britiſh troops ſhould be for puſhing on to battle, and the Germans not intereſted in the event, decline coming to an engagement. If I can truſt to memory, ſomething of this kind happened more than once in the civil wars of France, where the German troops were employed, and not without inconveniencies. German troops may join a Britiſh army in Germany, and harmony may ſubſiſt between them, and they may act in concert to repel a French army advancing into their country, and againſt whom there is a national antipathy; but it doth not follow that the ſame harmony ſhould take place when they join the Britiſh troops on American ground, and againſt the Americans for whom they can have conceived no hatred, in a cauſe in which they are not intereſted, and where the juſtice and equity of their drawing the ſword may excite the idea of ſelf-conſcious criminality.

But wherefore ſhould I waſte time in pointing out ſome of thoſe cauſes which will moſt probably conduce to make this war as unſucceſsful and calamitous in the concluſion, as it is ill-judged, dangerous and burthenſome in the beginning. Can we require any further conviction of this when we are aſſured that the ſame counſels, the ſame adminiſtration which forced us into this war, and which planned the former campaign, are the authors likewiſe of the preſent; whoſe

whoſe wiſdom is ſuch, that though it can afford nothing to hope for, yet it gives us every thing to fear. I have given many reaſons, which if not ſeparately, yet taken together, appear to me concluſive againſt undertaking this war, though it were aſſumed even by the ableſt of adminiſtrations; and if all others failed there is one particular which alone ſhould have deterred us from it, I mean THE JUSTICE OF OUR CAUSE; and this ſhall now be enquired into.

The Parliament of Great Britain claim the right and power of legiſlation and taxation over the Americans in all caſes whatſoever: and the non-compliance on the part of the American with this right and power being ſo veſted in the Parliament of Great Britain, is the cauſe of the preſent American war.

Now it is altogether conſonant to the Conſtitution of England at this day, and it is moreover an indubitable fact, that there cannot be a free Government, or in other words, the ſubjects cannot be a free People under any Government.

Firſt, Where the People do not make laws for themſelves; or are ſubject to any laws but thoſe of their own making.

Secondly, Where the People do not tax themſelves; or are ſubject to any taxation but that which they have conſented to, or have impoſed on themſelves.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, Where the People are not their own judges in all cauſes both civil and criminal.

Theſe three powers reſting in the hands of the people are the counterbalance to the whole of the Executive Power veſted in a ſingle Perſon. On this equilibrium of Power, the liberty of the ſubject, and the ſafety of the conſtitution entirely depend. If any part of the Executive Power were placed in the hands of the Subject the balance would be unequal, Power would preponderate on the ſide of the people, confuſion would enſue, and the conſtitution go to wreck. And if any of thoſe three Powers were to be veſted elſewhere than in the People, the Liberty of the ſubject would be immediately at an end.

If, therefore, the Parliament of Great Britain do exerciſe the power of legiſlation, and of taxation over the Americans; or in other words, If the Americans do not make laws for themſelves, and do not tax themſelves, but are to be ſubject to have laws made for them by others, and to have taxation impoſed on them by others, then the Americans are not a free people.

If Great Britain, therefore, doth make war againſt the Americans, becauſe they will not ſubmit to, and acknowledge the powers of legiſlation and taxation over them to be veſted in the Parliament of Great Britain: Great Britain doth then make war

againſt

againſt the Americans, becauſe they will not reſign their Liberty into their hands.

And, if Great Britain doth make war againſt the Americans becauſe they will not reſign their Liberty, then Great Britain doth make war againſt the Americans becauſe they will not conſent to become her ſlaves.

There cannot be, in my conception, a fairer deduction than this; and it proves to a demonſtration that the cauſe of the preſent war is, *That the Americans will not conſent to become Slaves*. Let every man therefore who lives in a Land of Freedom, who knows and enjoys ſo invaluable a bleſſing as Liberty, and who has ſentiments to enable him to feel for the deprivation of it in others, be judge of the JUSTICE of our cauſe in this American war. And as we cannot be ſo inſincere and hypocritical as to implore the favour of Heaven on this undertaking, ſanguinary as it is, but in proportion to the Juſtice on which it is founded; what right have we to imagine that Heaven will not turn the event of it againſt us to our ruin, by diſplaying its mercy and favour to that cauſe which is founded in Juſtice, and to thoſe who contend only to ſecure to themſelves the natural, juſt, and indiſputable rights and priviledges of mankind; and which, their fellow ſubjects in Great Britain and Ireland do enjoy?

Upon

Upon the whole therefore, the proſecution of this war cannot be approved, becauſe it is evidently founded in injuſtice; and becauſe the happineſs or miſery on the one hand, and on the other the lives of ſo many thouſand of our fellow ſubjects depend upon the iſſue. No political reaſons, let them obtend what they may, let them be ever ſo effectual to diſguiſe, to colour, or even to juſtify, actions and proceedings, conſidered in any other light as wholly unjuſtifiable, can however give a ſanction to a war undertaken by us with a view to deprive another part of our fellow ſubjects of that liberty which they have a right to enjoy in common with ourſelves, and to reduce them from the ſtate of fellow ſubjects and fellow participants in Freedom, to the abject condition of becoming our Slaves. The adoption of any other meaſure, provided it be founded in juſtice, is preferable to this: rather let the ambitious deſire for wide extended dominion (*ever attended with diſorder and bad adminiſtation

* Hiſtory, no where that I know of, furniſhes us with an account of any enormous Empire that was well governed: nor do I know of one at this day that is ſo. The extremities of ſuch empires are too far removed from the heart of government to admit its vital vigour to flow in them with that velocity which is neceſſary to conſtitute good government. The ordinances, which are ſtrictly complied with in provinces near the ſeat of government,

miniſtration of government throughout the univerſe) fall a ſacrifice to juſtice; and if the Americans are ungrateful let them be caſt off for their ingratitude, but let us not imbrue our hands in their blood, and at the expence of the lives of ſo many of our countrymen unjuſtly attempt to rivet upon them the ſhackles of ſlavery. And if they are

ment, become in a meaſure torpid before they reach the remote provinces of an enormous empire; and moreover theſe provinces are generally conſigned to the care of deputies, who, generally, the further they are removed from the ſeat of Empire, proportionably neglect the duties of their office; and it is well if the miſchief ends here, and that they do not conſider themſelves as lawful tyrants, and ſuch provinces as legal plunder; this, in time, eſpecially when carried to exceſs, is the cauſe of inſurrections, revolutions, and every evil that can diſgrace or injure government. If evils like theſe are almoſt inſeparable from enormous Empire, even where there is a continuity of territory, what may not be expected from ſuch, whoſe remote provinces, which make beyond all compariſon the greateſt territorial part of the empire, are intercepted by an ocean of three thouſand miles? Men may flatter themſelves with what notions they pleaſe on this matter; but I am perſuaded ſo enormous a territory as America, ſo far removed from the ſeat of Government, and fountain of juſtice, can never be well governed otherwiſe than by a legiſlation of its own; nor will it ſubmit to be governed in any other manner (however by violence it may be reduced to it for the preſent) one moment longer than that people are under the neceſſity of ſubmitting to ſuch kind of government; nothing can be more natural than to conclude, that as ſoon as they become ſufficiently powerful by increaſing numbers, they will certainly emancipate themſelves from ſuch a ſituation.

The

are not ungrateful, let a reconciliation be planned on principles of juſtice and liberty, by reſtoring to them their councils and aſſemblies with the powers that have been inſeperably annexed to them from their firſt foundation; in a word, let their own proper Governments be reſtored and eſtabliſhed. If there be inconviencies attendant upon either

The Romans, who were conſcious of this ill conſequence, endeavoured to anticipate it by removing from time to time the youth of ſuch provinces into their armies, where being ſlain in battle there was an end of them, and a conſtant demand for more; by which mean thoſe who would prove refractory and were capable of doing the moſt execution being thus out of the way, the reſt remained tolerably quiet where the oppreſſion of governors were not too ſevere to be borne. This incorporating the provincial youth in their armies might anſwer to a martial Nation which ſubſiſted by war; but can never be practiſed by Great Britain whoſe fort is commerce. We muſt have recourſe to another expedient if we mean to ſecure the Americans in peaceful obedience; and ſatisfied I am none other can be deviſed to make it firm, ſtable, and perpetual, than to place the Powers of legiſlation, taxation, and judging, in the hands of the People, while the executive power, at leaſt a great part of it, is entruſted to deputies appointed by the Crown. Thus might a perfect good Government be eſtabliſhed; and as all cauſe on the part of the People for emancipating themſelves from Government would ceaſe, conſequently all deſire of doing ſo would be at an end. America would no doubt by this mean become proſperous; how far it might think itſelf under the neceſſity of contributing towards the luxury and exceſſes of another ſtate I will not pretend to anſwer for. But this I will venture to aſſert, that no other mode of Government than that which is here pointed

either of theſe meaſures, they are not of that nature to be held in competition with the guilt which reſults from ſupporting by war a cauſe founded in injuſtice, ſupported by murther, and promoted by deſolation of every kind; in the progreſs of which, humanity ſhudders; reaſon is mocked to ſcorn; and Juſtice recedes from us at every ſtep we make.

pointed out will anſwer any other purpoſe than temporiſing, and will be found ineffectual to continue the Americans any longer in ſubjection when that period arrives in which they will be enabled to throw off the yoke. Such a Government can be beneficial neither to the governing nor the governed party; yet we are labouring through every thing juſt and unjuſt, and at all hazards, to eſtabliſh it, and to wait the event, though without any difficulty we might reject them; or with as little difficulty eſtabliſh among them a good, perfect, peaceful, and permanent Government if we pleaſed; as permanent, as the nature of enormous extent of Empire can admit of.

E N D.

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